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Abstract
Affect, Behavior & (Dys)Regulation:
Integrating Youth’s Projective Tests and Self-Reports
By
Laurel G. Wright
Advisor: Sasha Rudenstine, Ph.D.
Past and current research indicates that unconscious processes (e.g., outside the realm of
conscious awareness) contribute to aspects of adaptation and development, such as emotion
regulation, adaptability, interpersonal flexibility and overall identity formation. Further,
unconscious processes including: Defense Mechanisms (DMs), Affect Maturity (AM) and Object
Relations (OR), can be operationalized and scored using valid and reliable psychodynamic
instruments (e.g., Rorschach Inkblot Method), with theoretical and empirical links to underlying
emotion regulation processes. Currently however, emotional dysregulation and its sequelae (e.g.,
depression and ADHD symptoms) are most often assessed based on one’s conscious awareness,
using standardized self-report measures or structured clinical interviews. To date however, few
studies explicate underlying relationships and intersections between measures of unconscious,
psychodynamic constructs and self-report psychiatric symptoms, particularly among a diverse
sample of clinical service-seeking youth. Data for the current study was obtained as part of an ongoing programmatic evaluation of clinical services at a community-based mental health clinic in
Harlem, New York. Results and analyses are based on a sample of children and adolescents
between ages 8 – 17 (N = 51, 47% biologically female) presenting for psychological services
between September 2016 and September 2019.
Overall, results from the current study highlight several novel and significant outcomes
regarding underlying relationships between emption regulation processes and systems, including
iv

internalizing (i.e., turned inward) and externalizing (i.e., turned outward) symptoms in youth.
Across the entire sample, results revealed clinically elevated rates of psychiatric symptoms,
including: depression, hyperactivity, and to a lesser extent, inattentiveness. Further, unique
symptom patterns emerged according to age and biological sex, such that males reported higher
rates of hyperactivity compared to females (whose symptoms, unexpectedly, increased with age).
Outcomes further revealed that youth in the sample exhibited unhealthy and underdeveloped
Object Relations, significant delays in Affect Maturity development, and over-reliance on
primitive, rather than mature Defense Mechanisms (e.g., Denial). Significant between-group
differences also emerged, including greater Affect Maturity (AM) and use of mature defense
mechanisms (e.g., Identification) among females regardless of age.
As hypothesized, results revealed several significant relationships between unconscious
constructs and self-report psychiatric symptoms. First, unhealthy Object Relations (OR) and lower
Affect Maturity (AM) both predicted higher rates of depression (DEP T-scores) and Hyperactivity
/ Impulsivity (HYP T-scores), particularly among adolescents (ages 13 – 17); however only OR
remained significant after controlling for age and biological sex. Next, Affect Maturity mediated
the relationship between immature defense use and Defiance / Aggression (DEF) self-report
scores, suggesting a unique and interactive relationship between unconscious emotion-regulating
processes. Specifically, results suggest that healthy Object Relations (OR) and to a lesser extent,
Affect Maturity (AM) and mature Defense Mechanisms (e.g., Identification) may protect against
internalizing symptoms (e.g., depression) and symptoms (e.g., hyperactivity) during pre- and
adolescent stages of development. Further, underdeveloped AM, immature use of DMs or
unhealthy OR may increase risk for the onset of these symptoms during adolescence and later
stages of development. Unexpected and non-significant results are also discussed, followed by
v

recommendations for future explorations of relationships between unconscious, emotion
regulation processes and psychiatric symptoms among youth.

Key Words: emotion regulation, affect maturity, object relation(s), defense mechanisms(s),
psychiatric symptom(s), depression, Attention-Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)
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Introduction
Across the broad system of psychological services, children and adolescents represent a
distinct clinical subpopulation, by way of the onset, manifestations and trajectory of psychiatric
symptomology. Currently, outcomes from comprehensive clinical assessments and diagnostic
evaluations integrate results from multiple standardized instruments to inform clinical case
conceptualizations, identify appropriate service recommendations, and establish a course of
treatment (Achenbach, 1985; Achenbach, McConaughy & Howell, 1987; Achenbach et al., 1991).
More specifically, information regarding youth’s psychiatric symptoms and associated functioning
are most often assessed using criterion-driven measures completed by youth and collateral
informants (e.g., caregivers, teachers) (Achenbach, 1991; Cramer 2015; Zeman et al., 2002).
However, ‘objective’ clinical instruments operationalize complex phenomenon according to
explicit behavioral (e.g., actions) and/or affective (e.g., emotional) sequelae, which provides
limited insight regarding underlying etiology and psychological processes contributing to the
manifest symptoms (e.g., Fanti & Henrich, 2010; Keilet et al., 2000). Importantly, deficits in
systems of emotion regulation—the ability to modulate emotional responses to, or experiences of
distress to stimuli—have been shown to underlie core features of affective and behavioral
symptomology, including both internalizing and externalizing presentations (Cramer, 2001; 2015).
Empirical research suggests that emotion regulation begins during the earliest phases of life as
automatic, intrapsychic processes, which significantly transform one’s relationship to and overall
experience of emotions. Further, outcomes from projective tests (e.g., Rorschach Inkblot Method
and Thematic Apperception Test) have been used to operationalize and measure unconscious,
emotion regulation processes, including: Affect Maturity (AM) (Gray, 2018), Object Relations
(OR) (Eiges, 2014) and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs) (Cramer, 1998a; 1998b). However,
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few empirical studies have explored interconnections between unconscious aspects of emotion
regulation, psychological development/maturation and psychiatric symptoms among children and
adolescents (e.g., Cramer & Brilliant, 2001; Gray, 2018). To date, no empirical research studies
have explored the interaction and intersections of underlying relationships between unconscious
emotion regulation systems (e.g., Object Relations, Affect Maturity and Defense Mechanisms) and
further, as related to self-reported psychiatric symptoms (e.g., Depression and ADHD symptoms)
in a clinical sample of urban youth.
As a result, the current study intends to: a) provide an overview of the psychiatric and
intrapsychic landscape of a unique clinical population of children and adolescents seeking services
at a community based mental health clinic, b) explore underlying relationships (associative and
predictive) between youth’s self-reported psychiatric symptoms and unconscious, emotion
regulation assessments (e.g., projective tests), and c) consider implications for future applications
and interpretations of psychodynamically-informed instruments within clinical assessments and
evaluations. Overall, results from the current study contribute to a small, yet growing field of
research exploring the range and intersecting factors underlying emotional regulation capacities,
in the service of promoting developmentally appropriate, targeted and effective clinical
evaluations and interventions with children and adolescents.

2

Background & Literature Review
Affect, Behavior & (Dys)Regulation
Affect modulation and regulation are primary among developmental tasks and achievements;
as Tuber (2012) suggests, “even in the first few months of life, no affective experiences come
without some attempt at modulation or regulation," primarily by way of engaging an ‘other’
through “communications” (p. 37). Further, Sandler & Sandler (1986) assert that, “all meaning is
developmentally and functionally related to states of feeling” (p. 284), which serve as the central
pathways binding intrapsychic with physiological experiences. Broadly, emotion regulation refers
to a developmentally-driven capacity to effectively monitor, evaluate and modulate emotional
responses in terms of intensity, duration and valence across varied contexts (O’Neill & Rudenstine,
2018; Shaw et al., 2001). Importantly, the earliest automatic forms of emotion regulation are also
implicit, and may further include, “any process that operates without the need for conscious
supervision or explicit intentions and which is aimed at modifying the quality, intensity or duration
of an emotional response” (Koole & Rothermund, 2011, p. 390). Emotional dysregulation,
consequently, is the outcome of failed, implicit regulatory systems, resulting in maladaptive
behavioral and emotional responses, including both internalized (e.g., withdrawal) and/or
externalized (e.g., ‘acing out’) psychiatric symptoms (Shaw et al., 2014). Effective emotional
regulation also includes emotional awareness, labeling, tolerance and the flexibility to employ
varied strategies to maintain or restore a sense of physical and emotional equilibrium (O’Neill &
Rudenstine, 2018).
According to the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) of the NIMH (Insel, 2014), the inability
to regulate affective responses to negative stimuli is a key feature of children with externalizing
behaviors. Further, in one study conducted by Zeman, Shipman & Suveg (2002) self-report
3

measures were collected from a sample of 227 youth (106 girls) ages eight to eleven regarding
three domains of emotion regulation, including: 1) emotional awareness 2) expression
management and 3) emotional coping. Results revealed that up to forty-nine percent of the variance
in youth’s internalizing symptoms were accounted for by factors underlying emotion regulation,
including two subdomains: 1) poor emotional awareness and 2) difficulty identifying one’s
emotions.
Increasingly, emotion regulation is conceptualized as a “transdiagnostic treatment construct”,
which may predispose or increase vulnerability to multiple psychiatric and behavioral issues
including: mood disorders, substance use, eating and personality disorders (Sloan, Hall, Moulding,
Bryce, Mildred & Staiger, 2017). Further, a recent meta-analysis described limitations in “stress
tolerance” as a vulnerability factor associated with the transition from an individual being
clinically high-risk (CHR) to meeting full criteria for psychiatric conditions, including psychosis
(Schvarcz & Bearden, 2015). Berking & Wupperman (2012) suggest interventions targeting
emotion regulation may vary according to myriad factors, including specific domain(s) (e.g.,
types) of emotions which are being regulated. Effective interventions alleviate obstacles to scaffold
effective emotion regulation strategies. For example, recent treatments such as MentalizationBased Therapy for Children (MBT-C) (Muller & Midgley, 2015) have shown promising results
based on a 12-week manualized treatment for youth with externalizing presentations, and when
integrated as part of other psychotherapeutic orientations and techniques (e.g., psychoanalysis or
play therapy) (Muller & Midgley, 2015). The sections to follow include an overview of theoretical
and empirical research regarding externalizing, internalizing and combined presentations.
Externalization. Explanatory theories of externalization are highly variable, spanning a range
of intrapersonal and environmental factors, including: genetic etiology, neurobiological
4

development, sociocultural contexts, and more recently, underlying self-regulation (Olson, Choe
& Sameroff, 2017). Early research suggested externalizing behaviors to be fairly stable past age
six (Cicchetti & Toth, 1991). However, recent results from three large-scale studies revealed global
declines in externalization throughout childhood, most notably between ages nine and twelve
(Cramer, 2015; Fanti & Henrich, 2010; Keilet et al., 2000; Miner & Clarke-Stewart, 2008).
Relatedly, in a cross-sectional comparison of 151 nine-year-olds (69 males) and 132 twelve-yearolds (56 males), Cramer (2015) found more externalizing symptoms present among males, and a
significant decrease in externalization from ages nine to twelve, but found no significant
interaction based on age and biological sex. Prevalence of externalizing behaviors has also been
associated with parental factors, including familial composition, parental-styles and child-rearing
practices (Vazsonyi & Huang, 2010; Eisenberg et al., 2001). Similarly, early attachment patterns
and family environment have further been associated with conduct problems and oppositional
defiance (Erikson et al., 1985; Lyons-Ruth, 1996, Fearon and Belsky, 2011).
To date, most empirical research examines and lends support for sociobiological factors
underlying externalization. Importantly however, some evidence also lends support for
conceptualizing “externalized” affect and behaviors psychodynamically, such that externalization
is seen as reflecting underlying tensions between one’s needs and wants in the context of external
demands (Freud, 1965). In an early study conducted by Wolman, Lewis and King (1971) for
example, 256 children were interviewed about specific emotions they experienced and when;
responses were scored for internal (e.g., “inside” the self) versus external (e.g., “outside” the self)
attributions. As youth aged, they increasingly reported emotionally stimulating situations as
occurring within themselves rather than from “outside”, however interestingly, no consistent
pattern or age range for this shift could be identified. More recently, Jenkins & Oatley (1998)
5

proposed that externalization represents characterological, affective organizations predominated
by anger, or behavioral and goal “directedness” aimed towards “moving against the world”
(Jenkins & Oatley, 1998). Eisenberg et al. (2001) later found that children rated low on selfregulation by their caregivers were significantly more likely to be classified as “Externalizing”
(versus non-symptomatic or “Internalizing”) based on results from 136 child-parent dyads. Finally,
Zeman et al. (2002) further revealed that dysregulated expressions of sadness and uncontrolled
anger predicted more externalizing symptoms among a sample of children. Relatedly, results from
Glasberg & Aboud (1982) revealed that children ages eight to nine were significantly more likely
to identify with feelings of “sadness” as compared to five to six-year-olds. Combined, results
suggest that the transition from “acting out” one’s feelings to verbalizing and expressing them is
an adaptive process, and further, that externalization may give way to internalization as part of an
on-going developmental and regulatory process of emotional maturation.
Internalization. Unlike externalization, internalization reflects affective processes and
behavioral inhibition (or withdrawal) resulting from distress within the individual, as opposed to
the external environment. While less socially undesirable than externalizing peers, internalizing
youth also evidence affective and behavioral symptomatology, which are inherently less
observable and difficult to measure (Achenbach; 1991). Affectively, internalizing children are
characterized by increased anxiety, worry, fear and sadness or low mood (Eisenberg et al., 2001).
Behaviorally, internalizing children are characterized by patterns of withdrawal—including both
physical and attentional, and have further been proposed to have a constitutionally low threshold
or tolerance for negative emotionality or stimuli (Eisenberg et al., 2001; Jenkins & Oatley, 1998).
Further, Jenkins & Oatley (1998) suggested that internalization is based on an affective
organization dominated by fear and/or sadness, corresponding to manifest symptoms of loneliness,
6

which is reflected in increased rates of symptom self-reporting among both children and adolescent
populations. Relatedly, empirical results from Zeman et al. (2002) revealed that children and
adolescents characterized as internalizing are less emotionally expressive compared to healthy
controls. Further, children’s inhibition of anger predicted internalizations, whereas, unexpectedly,
suppression of sadness was unrelated. Results from empirical research suggest that, further,
predominantly internalizing youth have been characterized by movement “away from the world”
and towards safety within the self (Jenkins & Oatley, 1998).
Several competing theories exist regarding the underlying origins and progression of
internalization. Saami (1999), for example, concluded that internalizing symptoms were the result
of impoverished emotional insight combined with constructive mechanisms for self-modulation
(Zenman et al., 2002). Yet results from another study of 594 Italian adolescents concluded that
self-esteem and maternal / paternal emotional availability were the two most significant predictors
of adolescent depression (Babore et al., 2016). Further, studies reflect inconsistencies across
internalizing affective and behavioral presentations among youth, both in terms of change over
time and age-related rates of presenting problems. Specifically, results from two large-scale
longitudinal studies revealed relative stability in internalizing behaviors over the course of
development, whereas others have identified both increased and decreased rates among youth
(Cramer, 2015; Achenbach, 1985). Results from other research suggest that among seven to
sixteen-year-olds, low emotional awareness—a physical and psychological sense of one’s
emotions—predicted greater depression and anxiety symptoms across a one-year period (Kranzler
et al., 2016).
Combined Presentations. Broad deficits in underlying emotion regulation systems may
contribute to the onset and co-occurrence of externalization and internalization. For example, one
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study measured the impact of behavioral self-control, self- and emotion-regulation based on
outcomes from standardized self-report measures (Wills, Simons, Sussman & Knight (2013). From
a sample of 3,561 adolescents, Wills, Simons, Sussman & Knight (2013) concluded that indirect
pathways from emotion dysregulation lead to both internalizing and externalizing symptoms,
academic disengagement, incidents of negative life events, and overall, increased tolerance for
deviance.
Relatedly, empirical research with children and caregivers have also been used to underscore
emotion regulation systems with shared causal pathways underlying internalizing and
externalizing presentations. For example, Bowie (2010) developed and validated a 13-item,
structured clinical interview to help youth identify and interpret their own thoughts and feelings
about ways in which they respond internally and externally to strong emotions (e.g., anger and
sadness). Results showed that anger emotion regulation predicted less depression and anxiety,
whereas sadness emotion regulation did not. Further, results suggested that emotional regulation
processes may vary according to the specificity of the affect itself (e.g., anger versus sadness) or
the domain in which it presents (e.g., at home with caregivers, at school with teachers, or socially
with peers). Specifically, results revealed significant discrepancies between informant and selfreports, such that caregivers and teachers overestimated youth’s depression symptoms based on
low sadness regulation, and underestimated the impact of dysregulated anger on youth’s
depression and anxiety symptoms at a 12-month follow-up (Bowie, 2010). Combined, results
indicate that further study is warranted to better understand the complex networks underlying
emotion regulation systems and psychological functioning throughout the course of development.
Further, investigations should also continue to address discrepancies between measures of youth’s
self-report, and particularly, as they relate to implicit factors, which occur outside conscious
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awareness. As a result, the section below outlines several operationalized, measurable, although
unconscious constructs, which operate independently and in tandem with emotion regulation
systems.
Unconscious Processes, Regulation & Development
In addition to sociobiological factors, several interconnected psychodynamic constructs have
compelling theoretical and empirical connections to systems of emotional regulation, including:
Object Relations (OR), Defense Mechanisms (DMs) and Affect Maturity (AM). The following
section outlines the theoretical underpinnings and clinical utility of each construct, followed by an
overview of the validated and prevalent instruments designed to operationalize and measure each
phenomenon. Combined, the constructs below reflect several prominent intrapsychic processes
that scaffold development and are used to lay the groundwork for conceptualizing their impact on
formative developmental experiences related to emotion regulation.
Objects & Object Relationships. In the seminal paper ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917),
Freud was among the first to describe an intrapsychic ‘other’ in adult patients, and in particular, as
related to the use of defenses, wherein:
“identification is focused on as the means by which one not only remembers, but in part
emotionally replaces, a lost external object with an aspect of oneself that has been modelled
after the lost external object…in other words, an external relationship is replaced by an internal
one that involves an interplay of two active aspects of the person” (p. 90).
Melanie Klein (1946) expanded on Freud’s (1917) position, postulating that caregivers in the
“real” world exist as the first “object” in each infant’s developing world. However, by nature, the
object “relationship” takes place intrapsychically, or as an “unconscious experience or fantasy of
a concrete object physically located in the internal ego” (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 68). Importantly,
Klein (1956) theorized a developmental onset and evolution of object relationships, the first and
9

most “primitive” stage being the ‘paranoid-schizoid position’, wherein caregivers are experienced
only as “part” objects, corresponding to the infant’s binary (i.e., “all or nothing”) intrapsychic and
physiological “split.” During this period, the caregiver (or ‘object’) is not defined or experienced
as an independent, autonomous, ‘other’, but is rather defined in terms of the infant’s relationship
to the self. As a result, the soothing and “good” caregiver is one who satiates and satisfies the
hungry infant, in stark contrast to discomfort or deprivation, which is only associated with the
‘bad’ (other) caregiver (Klein, 1946). Further, Klein (1946) described a successful transition
through the initial ‘paranoid-schizoid position’ leading to the ‘depressive position’, characterized
by the infant’s awareness of separateness from the caregiver. Grotstein (1946), relatedly, termed
this phenomenon the original ‘primal split,' wherein anxieties are centralized around aggressive
and destructive wishes / phantasies, accompanied by the realization of one’s own capacity to drive
away, hurt or ‘destroy’ an ambivalently loved other. Intrapsychic integration results from
experiences wherein the infant can tolerate both ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ within the same object,
rather relying on differentiations between part objects (Klein, 1946). Further, Klein (1946)
proposed that the shift from part to whole objects also reflected the capacity to recognize that the
same object may at one time provide gratification and at another, induce distress or frustration.
According to Klein (1946), several significant interpersonal and prosocial consequences result
from working through the depressive position. For example, the emergence of sympathy,
responsibility, care and concern for others results when aggressive impulses are repressed and part
objects give way to whole object relatedness. Further, while schizoid defenses may still present
during this period, the capacity to experience grief and guilt give rise to new desires and abilities
to experience remorse, pursue reparation, and broadly, increase awareness of psychic reality. Klein
(1946) theorized that working through depressive anxiety also coincided with the withdrawal of
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projections, allowing for the object to exist as an independent and more reality-based entity. In
other words, the developing child amasses an increasingly differentiated sense of inner and outer
reality; the latter of which is newly occupied by autonomous individuals with their own needs and
subjectivity. Finally, Klein (1946) concluded that without successful resolution of the depressive
position, individuals persist in struggling through these foundational conflicts throughout the life
course, with significant consequences to their individual and interpersonal functioning.
Development of Object Relationships. Rather than unidirectional, object relational
phenomenon may better be understood as two-sided, mutual and reciprocally determined. As
Sandler & Sandler (1986) described, object relationships exist as a complex set of “cues and signs”
which are unconsciously exchanged and bidirectional in an effort to “get one person to respond in
a particular way” (p. 273). Relatedly, Bürgin (2011) described a three-part “intersubjective
exchange of affect” facilitating object relational development between caregiver and infant,
beginning first with the caregiver’s ability to recognize and identify an infant’s feeling states or
needs based on overt behaviors. As Winnicott (1969) further described, use of an object or
attachment figure is not inherent, but rather, predicated on access to a “facilitating environment”,
wherein an infant may first use the caregiver “ruthlessly”, by way of expressing–-and being
tolerated during expressions of–-extreme affect and aggression. Bion (1962) further posited that
under ideal circumstances, the caregiver’s tolerant acceptance both contains and processes the
evoked feelings and ideas, which in turn, make for a more “manageable and integrateable version
of that which has been projected…available for reinternalization” (p. 97). Cumulatively, and as
Tuber (2012) asserted, objects and internalized object relationships serve as “the primary catalyst
for integrative development” (p.12). Cumulatively, when a caregiver responds, not with an exact
imitation, but instead, with a corresponding action (or reaction) to the infant’s expression, both the
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affect and its expression can be recognized and reinternalized by the infant (Bion, 1962; Bürgin,
2011, Winnicott, 1950).
Importantly however, perfect symbiosis, or immediate/anticipatory attendance to these needs
is not necessary to foster healthy development. Rather, as Winnicott (1969) suggested, “goodenough” caregiving—characterized by predominantly (and relative to each infant’s needs)
consistent and predictable attention to a child’s physical and emotional needs—is sufficient to
foster emerging relational ties. Sandler & Sandler (1986) described “good” or “good enough”
object relationships as “affirmation”, “nourishment” and a source of a “fulfillment” for the infant
or child who is motivated to maintain these relational ties “in order to yield a background of safety”
(p. 275). Within the context of “good-enough” conditions, an infant expands new capacities to
tolerate variability and appreciation for novelty, rather than terror or overwhelm.
While only adequate conditions may suffice, Pine (1986) suggested that the consequence of
lacking a “good-enough” caregiving environment, by way of repeated and/or extensive emotional
dysregulation due to unmet needs, results in a panic anxiety, such that, “relief is not expected and
so the first sign of distress only signals the advent of greater distress” (p. 453). Thus, the impact
of emotional overwhelm may cause an influx, a flood of “psychic noise”, which in turn, disrupts
the formation, integration and maintenance of critical developmental achievements (Pine, 1986).
Further, James (1994) articulated an unremitting sense of endangerment resulting from insufficient
object relational development, as more than just “noise”, but in fact, “psychological trauma”,
debilitating the development or use of functional coping or self-soothing strategies. Consequently,
the interpersonal and environmental deficits which result, limit an infant’s or the developing
child’s capacity to tolerate ambiguity and perhaps most profoundly, integrate ‘goodness’ and
‘badness’ within the same object (relationship), and eventually within the self. Unlike the ‘good’
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or ‘good enough’ object, ‘bad’ internalized objects result from a caregiver’s insufficiency or
inability to attend to the infant’s needs. Or, as Winnicott posited, an infant’s sense of ‘self’ is
traumatically disrupted by a mother’s substitution of “herself” for the infant’s “separateness” (e.g.,
spontaneous gestures). When such ‘impingements’ are a central feature of the early mother-child
relationship, the infant will attempt to defend himself by developing a second (reactive) personality
organization (the False Self organization) (Winnicott, 1960). Relatedly, as Pine (1986) & Chethik
(1986) suggested, the hallmark of persistent affective dysregulation is associated with minimal
object constancy or mastery over emotional responses, when repetition, anticipation and labeling
of affective experiences are foreclosed. Disequilibrium due to physical discomfort, hunger, and/or
exhaustion, therefore, exist in stark contrast to states of satisfaction and satiation, as evidenced by
their distinct affective and behavioral expressions (e.g., screaming/crying versus cooing/laughter).
Affect Maturity. At the intersection of Piagetian, Systems and Psychoanalytic theories, Anne
Thompson (1981) proposed a developmentally organized model of affect and its maturation, based
on a “cognitive-intentional-constructivist” view of emotion. According to Thompson (1986), the
elements and organization of affect emerge and transform beginning with the earliest stages of life
and impact one’s response to emotionally laden (internal and external) stimuli. Regarding a threepart view of affective maturity, Thompson (1981) first described the underlying contribution of
cognitions and cognitive development related to emotions. Specifically, Thompson (1986) posited
that emotions provide not just a ‘container’ for psychological content, but rather, have their own
unique cognitive structures—operating both consciously and unconsciously—which expand and
evolve over the course of development. Further, Thompson (1986) asserted an inherently
intentional quality (e.g., goal-directedness) inherent to affective experiences and expressions, and
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further reflect the substantive quality of emotions (e.g., being “of” something), which are further,
“directed towards” someone or something.
Drawing on Fast’s “Event” Theory (1985), Thompson (1981) further proposed that myriad
individual and environmental interactions or “events” combined to influence one’s overall
affective experiences, including somatosensory experiences and physical actions, which
accumulate by the hundreds of thousands over the course of life. However, during the earliest
stages of development, each affective expression or “event” (e.g., crying, screaming) exists in
isolation in reaction to arousal, state changes and physiological disequilibrium. As Thompson
(1986) further asserted, affective expressions are most often directed towards a primary caregiver
in the infant’s best attempt to engage help-seeking from a supportive environment. Thompson
(1986) further argued a constructionist nature inherent to affective adaptation and growth, such
that each affective “event” contains opportunity for differentiation, integration, and increasingly
hierarchical organization of intrapsychic content.
Importantly however, the mechanisms through which affect has been differentiated and
integrated, and the particular forms of affect experienced by the individual, will inherently
influence experiences and expressions of emotion. For example, Thompson (1986), suggested that
affective regression involves first a “dedifferentiation” and next, a “resegregation”, “that is, a
"release of elements in the affect system from hierarchical control” and a return to former “eventlike, unsystematized affect states” (p. 210). Further, mixed, ambivalent and/or contradictory
emotions originate from increasingly differentiated experiences, which in turn, support tolerance
for distress or unpleasure in the future (Thompson, 1986). As Thompson (1981) further described:
“children at different developmental levels might experience the same emotion, but it would take
different experiential forms depending on the child’s affective developmental level…it may be the
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case that certain emotions may require a degree of development before they can emerge at all”
(Thompson, 1981, p. 157). Consequently, Thompson (1986) posted that emotional experiences
were organized along a developmental trajectory influenced by an on-going interaction between
intrapersonal and interpersonal factors.
Development of Affect Maturity. Among other achievements, the on-going process of
intrapsychic development supports complex and nuanced differentiation of internalized object
relationships, which continue to evolve and adapt with new experiences. Specifically, Thompson
(1981) proposed affective maturation as the process of experiential differentiation and integration
between the self and the external world as mediated through individual experiences or “events.”
Relatedly, Thompson (1981; 1986) described the process of object differentiation affording an
opportunity to experience “how one feels about the object” as separately from “how the object
really is” in the world (p. 211). Further, she proposed that increased differentiation promotes
emotional reality testing (e.g., judging emotions as “appropriate” or “inappropriate”) according to
‘objective’ features of an object or experience (Thompson, 1986, p. 211). As individual object
relationships expand, ‘object worlds’ emerge based on interpersonal meaning-making and
integration of new experiences. Consequently, it is precisely the internal representation of self and
other, and their degree of individuation, which influences the form and degree of maturity an
emotion takes on (Thompson, 1986).
However, Ogden (1977) proposed that projective identification functioned as one form of selfother relatedness in which the ‘other’ is experienced as an extension of the self, rather than a
separate individual, characterized as a stage of development “between subjective object and that
of true object relatedness” (p. 23). Similarly, Hinshelwood (1989) suggested that although internal
objects mirror aspects of reality, they also contribute significantly to the way the “external objects
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are themselves perceived and experienced”, primarily by way of projection (Hinshelwood, 1989,
p. 68).
Earlier empirical results from Borke (1973) support Thompson’s (1986) developmental model
of affective maturation and underscore the significance of developmental achievements in
differentiation and integration. Results from clinical interviews with non-clinically sampled youth
found that children up to age eight struggled to accurately match sadness and anger when presented
with emotionally charged situations, lending support for an undifferentiated behavioral response
when confronted with either affect-inducing situation. Relatedly, recent empirical results from a
clinical sample of children and adolescents found significant correlations between youth’s
chronological age and average Affect Maturity score (AMS-M) based on Thompson’s Affect
Maturity Scale (AMS; 1986) (Gray, 2018; to be further outlined in Methods section below).
Defense Mechanisms. In the Neuro-Psychoses of Defense (1894), Freud first introduced the
concept of “defense mechanisms” in relationship to manifest symptomology articulated by
analysands. Characterized as unconscious—outside the realm of conscious awareness—and
automatic mental processes, defense mechanisms manifest in response to internal stimuli—
namely, affective (emotional) provocations, including drives and conflicts. Functionally, Freud
proposed defenses as the ego’s attempt to disrupt actualization of “drive instincts” or “impulses”
residing within the id, and which would otherwise be subject to harsh scrutiny/punishment by the
superego (1894). Anna Freud (1965), further posited that defense mechanisms operate
intrapsychically to modulate one’s affective state of arousal, which emerge in response to inner
impulses that incite conflict, either within the self, or in response to the outside world. As she
suggested, “even when the anxiety and the defense seem to relate to the outside world, he is really
afraid of his own inner process” (A. Freud, 1965, p. 101). Eventually, defenses, including
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intrapsychic processes and associated external manifestations (i.e., verbal and non-vernal
expressions), would become a primary focus of an individual’s psychoanalytic treatment. This is
based on the notion that identifying, exploring and ultimately interpreting a defense mechanism
would unlock and relinquish psychological and/or related physical symptoms (Freud, 1917). When
utilized successfully, defenses support “ego strengthening”, elasticity and resourcefulness; a sense
of self-assurance builds with continued competence and capability to manage internal and
environmental stressors, which is critically supported by one’s ability to metabolize, diffuse or
tolerate emotions (Gramzow et al., 2000; Murphy, 1960).
Unlike ‘coping’, defense mechanisms have been theoretically and empirically distinguished
from conscious, “cognitive and behavioral efforts to master, reduce or tolerate the internal and/or
external demands” from stressful interactions or environments (Folkman, 1984, p. 843).
Importantly, however, Cramer (1998a) indicated that while defending and coping have historically
been understood as related phenomenon, they reflect “alternative expressions underlying “generic
processes that people use to solve their general problems of living” (p. 103). Namely, that “the
difference between inhibition and ego restriction is that in the former the ego is defending itself
against its own inner processes and in the latter against external stimuli” (Cramer, 1998a, p. 101).
Relatedly, and although first described in relation to dysfunction, defense mechanisms are
categorically understood as a “measure of normal functioning, not psychopathology” (Yasnovsky
et al., 2003). Rather, use of defenses have been shown to reflect ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’, and
contribute to ongoing developmental processes, including: affect regulation, adaptability,
interpersonal functioning and self-concept (Cramer, 2009; Schibuk et al., 1989). Namely, defense
mechanisms are employed to secure he ego and shield it from ‘unpleasure’ caused by the
interchange between internal and external stimuli. Freud (1965) also suggested that defenses may
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serve a “holding” functioning so as to enable development and growth during periods of transition.
Similarly, Cramer (2009) described defenses as relied upon, and perhaps most functional during
the transition into the latency stage of development, which ushers in a host of new developmental
tasks and challenges, particularly as one begins to relate to and interact with the social
environment.
Development of Defense Mechanisms. Rather than a direct or linear evolution, defense use
has been shown to manifest through a unique developmental trajectory, in which “primitive” (e.g.,
cognitively least complex) defenses first emerge to modulate affective and physiological arousal.
An evolving use of defense mechanisms results as a function of changes in cognitive complexity
(Chandler et al., 1978; Thompson, 1981; Whiteman, 1967). For example, results from studies
conducted by Cramer (1998a & 1998b) indicate that the concept of ‘denial’ is incomprehensible
for children at the age of six, whereas both ‘denial’ and ‘repression’ can be understood by age ten,
and eventually, ‘projection’, by young adolescence. Further empirical studies highlight underlying
relationships between linguistic and cognitive development as they impact the use of defense
mechanisms. Specifically, Cramer & Brilliant (2001) first administered the Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT) to 122 children—grouped as ‘younger’ (1st or 2nd grade) and ‘older’ (5th
or 6th grade)—and later, with four stories incorporating either denial or projection (two of each).
After reading, children were asked to retell the story (to ensure comprehension), and later, to
describe the underlying motivation of a given character—either as a form of ‘denial’ or
‘projection.’ Overall, results revealed that children in the older age group were significantly less
likely to use denial and simultaneously, more likely to identify a character’s use of denial during
the story activity. Ultimately, results supported Cramer’s hypotheses regarding the developmental
and cognitive processes underlying defense mechanisms: 1) successful use of any defense
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mechanism, is in part, predicated on one’s lack of conscious awareness of the defensive process
(either by being disguised or not understood cognitively), and by extension, 2) children’s ability
to utilize defenses precedes an understanding of the process or function of a defense mechanism.
Consequently, as developmental and cognitive phenomenon, when formative defenses—such as
denial—are cognitively understood, they are significantly less likely to be utilized as a primary
defense, and replaced with more complex mechanisms, such as projection (Cramer & Brilliant,
2001).
Further, McWilliams (2011) suggests that use of defense mechanisms is influenced by at least
four distinct factors, including: 1) one’s constitutional temperament, 2) defenses modeled by
parents and other significant figures, 3) nature of the stresses during early childhood and 4)
resultant outcomes/consequences for use of particular defenses (including positive and negative
reinforcements). Relatedly, Vaillant’s (1977) longitudinal study was the first to suggest that
defensive style could endure as a lasting personality trait, with mature components facilitating
growth and adaptability, and immature aspects resulting in maladaptation and psychopathology.
Relatedly, differences and changes in defensive styles over the course of development have been
empirically identified among children as early as age four (Brody & Rozek, 1985).
Defense Mechanisms & Functioning. According to early psychoanalysts and contemporary
empirical researchers, defense mechanisms operate in the service of emotional modulation and
regulation, which take place automatically and outside the realm of conscious awareness (Freud,
1917; Cramer 2001, 2015). Immature defenses (e.g., denial) are the first to emerge during infancy.
As Sandler & Sandler (1986) described, “the child does not initially try to get rid of feelings of
unpleasure by projecting them into the ‘external’ world, but rather the child simply tries to make
them disappear” (p. 288). However, over the course of development, reliance on immature defense
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mechanisms should give way to and be replaced by increasingly sophisticated (e.g.,
cognitively/interpersonally) defense mechanisms (e.g., Identification) and in accordance with
mastery over new individual and interpersonal demands.
Early theorists suggested that one’s capacity to employ defenses flexibly and variably is one
aspect of their overall health. Specifically, Murphy (1960) suggested that adaptive use of defenses
“includes the capacity to use one mechanism at one time and another later, as well as the capacity
to use different ones together as they are needed” (p. 148). Similarly, and as A. Freud later wrote
(1965):
“At particular periods in life and according to its own specific structure, the individual ego
selects now one defensive method, now another—it may be repression, displacement, reversal,
etc.—and these it can employ both in its conflict with the instincts and in its defense against
the liberation of affect” (p. 32).
Further, and as Schibuk et al. (1989) summarized, “it is only the rigidity, the age inappropriateness,
and the failure of the defense to promote adaptation that leads it to be considered as pathological”
(p. 582). However, several factors influence the degree to which one’s use of defense mechanisms
operates adaptively and in service of promoting their overall functioning. In particular, an
overreliance on primitive or developmentally immature defenses (e.g., Denial) may occur from an
interplay between demands which exceeds one’s internal resources (Cramer, 2001).
Consequently, limitations in emotional and overall self-regulation result in maladaptive responses,
and failed efforts to sustain overall functioning (Schibuk, 1989). Further, “fixed” or rigid use of
immature defense mechanisms—rather than adaptiveness and flexibility—often represents a
“desperate clinging” or regression to an earlier stage of development in response to “flooding”
(e.g., extreme and overwhelming distress) (Pine, 1986).
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Several empirical studies highlight ways in which the development and use of mature defense
mechanisms may serve a protective function, or alternatively, increase psychological vulnerability
(when immature). For example, Cramer & Kelly (2004) found that immature defense use was
associated with personality disturbance in preschoolers, above and beyond other measures of
individual / personality traits. Regarding specific symptom domains, the authors also noted
significantly higher rates of immature defense use among youth diagnosed with Conduct Disorder
(CD), versus Adjustment Reaction (AR) symptoms (Cramer & Kelly, 2004). Another study of 437
non-clinical adolescents found that use of immature defenses (e.g., denial and projection)
significantly predicted ODD Reactive Aggression, Overt Aggression and Schizophrenia (Muris,
Winands & Horselenberg, 2003). In contrast, mature defense use has been associated with positive
outcomes across domain-specific and global functioning into adulthood demonstrate positive
relationships between use of mature defenses and domain-specific and global functioning
(Erickson, Feldman & Steiner, 1996; Muris et al., 2003; Valliant 1977; 1994).
Studies with child and adolescent populations have further revealed positive relationships
between mature defense use (e.g., Identification) and global measures of functioning (Cramer,
Blatt & Ford, 1988). More recently, outcomes from one prospective, longitudinal study (Cramer
& Tracy, 2005), examined the pathway between early childhood development and (mal)adjustment
according to use of defense mechanisms based on outcomes from a prospective, longitudinal study
through the Berkeley Guidance Study. Outcomes from the sample of sixty-two children (ages 9 –
12) revealed that mature defense use (e.g., Identification) was associated with positive shifts in
self-confidence (trait), and further, predicted fewer symptoms of depression and anxiety, and
improvements in overall psychological health (Cramer & Tracy, 2005).
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Overall, results from cross-sectional and longitudinal studies suggest that psychiatric
symptomology (e.g., depression and anxiety) results from insufficient or ineffectual emotion
regulation. Further empirical research indicates that unconscious psychological processes (e.g.,
defenses), which occur implicitly and automatically, significantly contribute to one’s overall
affective experience and response. Combined, outcomes suggest further research is warranted to
investigate intersections and interactions between unconscious, emotion regulation processes and
psychiatric symptomology. Accordingly, the sections the follow include an overview of historical
and contemporary methods for operationalizing, measuring and interpreting outcomes from
projective tests which can in turn, be used to measure unconscious, emotion regulation processes.
Projective Assessments & Instruments
Projective tests provide clinically relevant information used to inform psychiatric diagnoses,
assessments and evaluations, and in turn, clinical recommendations and treatment interventions
(Appelbaum, 1977). Use of projective techniques with clinical populations of children and
adolescents emerged, specifically, in response to increased interest and evidence indicating longterm psychological effects resulting from childhood and early developmental experiences
(Francis-Williams, 1968). As a result, age and domain-specific protocols, instruments, scoringsystems and measurements have emerged to capture a constellation of clinically indicated
information regarding aspects of child and adolescent functioning. An overview of the projective
instruments relevant to the current study are described below, including the corresponding scoring
/ coding systems used to meaningfully interpret results after clinical administration.
Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM). The Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM), was developed by
Hermann Rorschach (1927; Acklin & Oliveira-Berry, 1996), a Swiss psychiatrist intrigued by the
vast landscape of unconscious material and sensorium. Rorschach posited that exposure to
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ambiguous stimuli—inkblots, for instance—could induce intrapsychic activation, which would
materialize as projections onto the inkblots. Rorschach further posited that individuals who
articulated movement in the cards— “Introversives” as he labeled them—would also manifest with
more intrapsychic vividness and vitality (1927). Importantly, movement responses were also
understood as providing important information regarding an individual’s relational experiences of
the self and other (Exner, 1969; Klopfer & Kelly, Porcelli et al., 2013). In contrast, individuals
who were more responsive to the chromatic properties of the cards were labeled as “Extratensives”,
and conceptualized as more emotionally labile, driven by the “immediacy of the moment” (Tuber,
2012, p. 53). Rorschach characterized an individual’s balance or tendency towards one or both
ends of each spectrum as their “experience type”, referring to the way in which they processed the
world and illuminated the “how” and “what” of individual behavior, beyond just the “why” (Tuber,
2012). Further, Rorschach posited that aspects of both intrapersonal and interpersonal relatedness
could be distinguished and differentiated according to the kind and quality of their responses,
which would be further developed by Urist (1977) as outlined in the section below.
Measuring Object Relations (OR). Empirical research highlights myriad ways in which
Object Relations (OR)—originally a psychoanalytic, phenomenological construct—could be
captured, operationalized and measured, and further, influence individual and psychosocial
functioning. More specifically, across a wide range of psychopathology and psychiatric symptoms,
measures of OR have been shown to correspond with and/or predict psychiatric symptoms and
conditions, including: thought disorder, lifetime psychosis and overall severity of psychiatric
symptoms (Thom, 2016; Blais, Hilsenroth, Castlebury, Fowler & Baity, 2001; Blatt, Tuber &
Auerbach, 1990; Fowler, Hilsenroth & Nolan; Goddard & Tuber, 1989; Harder, Greenwald,
Weschler & Ritzler, 1984; Leifer, Shapiro, Martone & Kassem, 1991). Similarly, measures of OR
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have been shown to meaningfully differentiate patients according to personality organization (e.g.,
neurotic, borderline and psychotic), predict re-hospitalization among psychiatric inpatients, and
correspond to patients' overall treatment response, including adherence and continuation
(Ackerman et al., 2000; Blatt et al., 2001; Cook, Blatt & Ford, 1995; Hilsenroth, Handler, Toman
& Padawer, 1995; Horner & Diamond, 1996; Spear et al., 1984; Tuber, 1983). Object relations
scales have similarly demonstrated the capacity to differentiate among treatment groups when
investigating the mechanisms of change in mental representations over the course of treatment,
which may facilitate appropriate and sensitive interventions congruent with an individual’s
capacity to engage within a therapeutic relationship (Blatt & Shahar, 2004).
Mutuality of Autonomy Scale (MOA). Urist (1982) asserted that animate movement percepts
from the RIM captured a child’s “changing conception of its relative embeddedness in, or psychic
separateness from, figures in the external world” (p. 450). Convergent with later object relational
theorists such as Kohut (1966) and Kernberg (1977), Urist (1977; 1982) more broadly asserted
that kinesthetic (e.g., ‘movement’) portrayals corresponded to one’s experience and representation
of human relationships. Accordingly, Urist (1977) developed the Mutuality of Autonomy (MOA)
scale to operationalize and measure Object Relations (OR) along a spectrum of (un)health based
on responses to the Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM). The MOA Scale is based on a seven-point
continuum, from “mutuality” to “autonomy”, with each point distinguishing a significant
difference in one’s self-other experiences. Scale points 1 (MOA1) and 2 (MOA2) reflect the
healthiest / highest level of object representation, including responses with autonomous figures
interacting reciprocally or mutually engaged in parallel. Scale points 3 (MOA3) and 4 (MOA4)
apply to non-autonomous or interdependent relationships (e.g., one figure leaning on another or
being a mirror image of the other). Finally, scale points 5 (MOA5), 6 (MOA6) and 7 (MOA7)
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denote the least mutual autonomy and further, an imbalance of power, control and/or malevolence
within the figure’s relationships (Ryan & Grolnik, 1985). All scorable responses from the RIM are
assigned an MOA scale score (MOA1 – 7) and combined, reflect the range of one’s repertoire for
interpersonal relationships (Mayman, 1967). The average MOA score (MOA-M) is further derived
from one’s mean score.
Regarding its psychometric properties, the MOA scale has shown validity in measuring one’s
object relational health or functioning, including, concurrent validity with other measures of object
relationships clinical populations (Urist, 1977; Urist & Shill, 1982; Harder et al., 1984). The MOA
has also been used to distinguish between patients' diagnostic groups, overall prognosis and
outcomes mental health (Coates & Tuber, 1985; Goldberg, 1987; Leifer, Shapiro, Martone &
Kassem, 1991). For example, the MOA scale has been shown to predict interpersonal behaviors
and future hospitalizations among adult inpatient populations with personality and / or psychotic
spectrum diagnoses (Blatt et al., 1990; Fowler, Hilsenroth & Nolan, 2000; Leichsenring, 2004;
Tuber, 1983). Further, the single healthiest object relations score has been shown to predict no
future hospitalizations among a sample of patients diagnosed with Schizophrenia, whereas the
presence of a relatively unhealthy object relations score was associated with later rehospitalizations (Ackerman, Hilsenroth, Clemenge, Weatherill & Fowler, 2001; Blatt, Tuber &
Auerbach, 1991). Among children and adolescents, one study fewer adaptive MOA scores
corresponded to greater separation anxiety among a sample of diagnosed boys (N = 19) as
compared to a peer control group (Goddard & Tuber, 1989). Relatedly, another study found that
children diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) evidenced significantly more adaptive
MOA scores compared to those diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) (Thomas,
1987). In addition, the MOA successfully predicted re-hospitalization among a group of 70 boys
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within an inpatient psychiatric treatment setting (Tuber, 1983). Finally, adaptive MOA scores have
been shown to correspond with higher teacher ratings of children’s interpersonal functioning,
perceived control and academic performance (Ryan, Avery & Grolnick, 1985).
Empirical investigations and clinical applications of the MOA scale have varied widely,
including the use and application of the scoring system itself. Seminal theorists and researchers
asserted that the MOA scale score range (i.e., single highest and lowest scores) reflected not only
the phenomenological range inherent to object relations, but also, the real-life range of
interpersonal exchanges and interactions (e.g., Mayman, 1967; Tuber, 1992). Fowler et al. (2005),
specifically, argued that the most accurate representation of an individual’s object relational
experience is captured by the fluctuations in ego functioning, rather than a single or even average
score. However, recent research studies have also used one’s average or modal MOA score derived
from a complete RIM record (Ackerman et al., 2001). One study conducted by Cooper (2003), for
example, used MOA scores from 100 children to establish a baseline and normative range for a
non-clinical population. MOA score results indicated predominantly benign interactions and a lack
of malevolent responses among a sample of asymptomatic youth.
Alternative Measures of Object Relations. An alternative to the Mutuality of Autonomy
(MOA) scale (Urist, 1977), the Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale (SCORS; Westen et
al., 1985), is the most widely used measure of object relations. Unlike the MOA scale, the SCORS
scoring system is applied to responses obtained from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)
(Westen et al., 1985). Based on four dimensions interweaving social cognition and object relations,
the SCORS system incorporates several dimensions of object relatedness, including: 1)
Complexity of Representation (self and other differentiation); 2) Affect Tone of Relationships
(benevolence and/or malevolence); 3) Understanding of Social Causality (causal attributes
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ascribed to the character’s thoughts; feelings are accurate, complex and psychologically-minded);
and 4) Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships and Moral Standards (regard for others
exceeds need-gratifying, moral standards are considered and relationships are experienced as
meaningful and committed) (Westen et al., 1985).
Results from preliminary empirical studies revealed the SCORS to be an instrument with sound
psychometric properties and utility for measuring object relational phenomena. Specifically, the
SCORS demonstrated test-retest reliability and discriminant validity with both clinical and nonclinical samples of adolescents and adults (Ackerman et al., 1999; Barends, Westen, Leigh, Silbert
& Byers, 1990; Westen, Lohr et al., 1999). Pathological measures of OR, as indicated by the
SCORS, have also been associated with a broad range of psychological disorders (Bedi et al., 2012;
Huprich, 2001; Huprich, Porcerelli, Binienda, Karana, & Kamoo, 2007; Kernhof, Kaufhold, &
Grabhorn, 2008; Twomey, Kaslow, & Croft, 2000; Westen, Ludolph, Block, et al., 1990).
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan &
Murray, 1935) is a used projective instrument most often used in psychological testing assessments
or clinical evaluations, more broadly. Clinical utility of the TAT is multifaceted, embedded both
in the administrative / procedural and content / thematic aspects of the task. Regarding its
structural function, Rapaport et al. (1968) articulated the ways in which an individual’s drives
(instincts or otherwise) may emerge through the matrix of both conscious and unconscious
materials using TAT responses:
“…the organization of sufficiently large segments of communication, ideational content,
always bears some traces of the organization of motivating forces—that is, of the personality.
But as segments of communicated ideational content range from the commonplace to the
idiosyncratic, the testing of ideational content can be efficacious only if it differentiates
between conscious and unconscious ideational contents, motivations and attitudes” (pg. 469).
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Relatedly, Cramer (1999) described the TAT as an expressive outlet for a subject or storyteller to
develop a “narrative” using prompts and images. Cramer (1999) suggested that TAT stories reflect
a “construction of reality, not a reconstruction”, revealing unconscious processes and meaningmaking through the process of narration (p. 74).
In addition to unconscious drives or conflicts, results from the TAT can be scored for other
psychodynamic constructs, including object relations. Westen (1991) for example, suggested that
the TAT can be used to assess object relationships, due to the “ambiguous interpersonal” situations
depicted in the cards (p. 367), and developed the Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale
(SCORS) outlined in detail above. Westen, Ludolph, Block et al. (1990), for example, identified
significantly worse SCORS outcomes and lower developmental functioning among adolescent
females diagnosed with BPD, as compared to peers with another psychiatric diagnosis (e.g., mood
disorders) or a control group of high school students. A subsequent study conducted with adult
BPD patients (as compared to inpatients diagnosed with depression and a control group), replicated
initial outcomes from the adolescent groups and further demonstrated use of the object relations
as a robust clinical construct for differentiating intrapsychic functioning among patient populations
(Westen et al., 1990).
Affect Maturity Scale (AMS). Developed by Thompson (1981), the Affect Maturity Scale
(AMS) is a standardized coding system which captures the evolving nature of affect using
qualitative responses from the TAT. Thompson (1981; 1986) proposed that Affect Maturity and
outcomes from the AMS reflect multiple facets of emotional maturation, including: differentiation
of self-, other, environmental, and other temporal realities, experience of agency regarding
emotions, and attributions of emotions towards the self and others. Rather than evaluating the
presence or absence of a particular affect (e.g., anger, sadness), AMS scores are based on a five28

point continuum—designated as Levels I through V—which reflect the range of affective overall
intentionality and cognitive organization (Thompson, 1981). Psychometrically, the AMS has been
shown to have adequate inter-rater reliability (Cohen, 1988), although only by way of two
documented studies based on child populations (Goudsmit, 20101; Gray, 20182). Additionally, the
AMS has been shown to have discriminate validity for both IQ and age, but not education level,
based on an adult population (Thompson, 1981).
Level I. Characteristically, the period between birth and age two is uniquely visceral, defined
by sensorimotor capacities and interactions (e.g., physical contact/touch), which can later be made
meaningful by increasingly complex cognitive abilities. Meaningful interactions with varied
objects and stimuli support the on-going process of self/other differentiation, inviting cognitive
and conscious awareness to distinguish internal from external experiences. At this stage, affect is
primitive, powerful and manifests globally (as opposed to discrete, isolated or circumstantially
specific, as an “event-like” experience) (Thompson, 1986). Affective ebbs and flow correspond to
changes in cognitive representations of the self, other, environment and reality. Without a core,
differentiated sense of self and other, emotions manifest with an “atmospheric” quality which is
both unstable and unsystematized, but also highly labile. Consequently, one may be “within” an
emotional state, subsumed by an intensity that transcends conventions of time and space; this
moment predominates, and is the only that has ever, and will ever be. An affective state comes to
define reality—past, present, and by extension, is experienced as an indefinite future. Until perhaps
without notice, intention or awareness, a shift into another all-encompassing state takes place
(although this is neither cognitively nor affectively felt to be possible). Yet the ephemeral and
labile quality of this affective “storm” is misleading; self-, other, environmental etc., are entangled,
1
2

Kappa coefficients, 0.78, 95% CI: 0.74-0.83.
Pearson correlation, two-tailed test, r(10)= 0.913, p <.01.
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resulting in an overwhelming totality, even if just for a fractured moment. Actions too, become
intrinsically enmeshed with each affective state; they are the involuntary consequence of the
uncontrollable totality. Without access to complex cognitive systems and processes (e.g., object
permanence), a fractured dichotomy emerges, distinguishing only “everythingness” from
“complete nothingness”; until another, different state replaces it. Combined, features of the most
primitive affective state characterize a disorganized, yet fully inextricable, mind/body state.
Affects are not experienced—nor communicated—directly, rather, they are most often emergent
in bodily sensations and/or physical actions.
Level II. Between ages two and six, sensorimotor experiences still organize significant aspects
of cognitive and affective experiences and contribute to the overarching state of egocentrism—an
inability to perceive or understand that which is beyond the self. During the preoperational phase,
the child’s overarching self-centrism corresponds to distinct limitations in cognitive capacities,
including: centration—the tendency to isolate and define an event based on a single aspect of the
total circumstance, and cognitive irreversibility—the inability to conceptualize and experience
opposing thoughts and/or feelings simultaneously. Combined, these cognitive processes result in
unidimensional and polarized experiences, which are fixed while activated, but subject to
subsequent change. Some rudimentary differentiation between the self and other is present, yet
there is a lack in the understanding of individuated selves with distinct inner psychological
realities. Affects continue to occupy predominantly physical representations, void of concrete
observations including facial expressions or bodily positions. As a result, emotions largely exist
as independent entities apart from the self, perhaps moving towards, away from, or experienced as
“lodged” within the self, rather than “being.” As an external force, affects are not inherently
reversible, but are subject to rapid, successive change, even without integration or in direct
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relationship to one another. Preoperational children may have the vague sense that they “are” or
become the “doer” of an affective state without a sense of agency. Emergent guilt or regret is
associated with an undesirable outcome or associated consequence of an affect-event.
Level III. Next, the concrete operational phase—between ages six and eleven—signifies
further cognitive and affective shifts. Cognitively, reversibility is increasingly possible, affording
awareness that the present emotion is subject to change, and by extension, an object may be
assessed separately from the current affective state. Importantly, reversals during this period lack
awareness of influential forces, including one’s own internal state. While intrapsychic processes
can be identified in both the self and the other, children do not experience them as separate entities,
but rather, if the same emotion is experienced, it is assumed to be for identical reasons. Another
important development takes place as affective experiences shift from externalized entities
intruding upon the self, to internalized states that occur in response to external stimuli. Relatedly,
two affective states can now be held simultaneously, yet remain segregated due to limitations in
awareness of inner psychological experiences: a child may identify feeling both hurt and angry but
fail to register that being hurt incited anger. With increased internalization of affect and social
expectations, children in the concrete operational phase are not only able to better identify artificial
or fabricated emotions in others, but they are increasingly able to identify agency in their own
emotional expressions.
Level IV. Individuation—attributing unique and discrete affects to individuals—first emerges
with the onset of adolescence. Yet categorical markers and traits such as gender, age, occupation,
etc., are overused to ascribe meaning, often resulting in unidimensional and inflexible conclusions
about the inner motivations and wishes of others. While affective ambivalence and conflict are
identifiable, they are not well tolerated or easily resolved. Accordingly, the precursors of
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reversibility emerge, resulting in a complex/intricate interpretation of a given situation that
incorporates aspects of the self and circumstances more broadly, without directly modifying one
another. Nonetheless, decision-making takes on more intentionality, shifting towards thoughtful
planning, and away from pure impulse inhibition. Regret and remorse newly result from operations
based on pure impulse.
Level V. Affect maturity in adulthood is characterized by the highest level of self-other
differentiation as well as integration of self-other-affect. Events or factors that incite an affective
response are still understood and experienced as distinct from the emotional experience itself.
Affects are experienced as a unique and critical part of one’s individual history, which in turn
allows for conflicting/contradictory emotions to be experienced and tolerated. As indicated by the
developmental shifts in affect maturity, emotions provide an intrapsychic landscape for the
cultivation of self-knowledge, as well as the binding fibers to connect with others.
Measuring Defenses Mechanisms. Unlike Affect Maturity (Thompson, 1981), outcomes
from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) have often been used to evaluate use of defense
mechanisms (DMs) (Muemer et al., 2015) Specifically, empirical research studies have indicated
significant differences in DMs between clinical and non-clinical samples, and further, have been
shown to accurately differentiate patients across diagnostic presentations (e.g., eating and mood
disorder versus borderline and other personality disorders) (Cramer, 1999; 2004; 2015; Westen et
al., 1985).While self-report measures of defense mechanisms exist (e.g., Bond, 2004),
hypothesized relationships within the current study are based on an unconscious operationalized
definition and method of measurement of defenses, as outlined in the section below.
Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM). Cramer’s Model of Defense Mechanisms and
corresponding Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM; 1999) posited a unique developmental
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trajectory for defense mechanisms beginning in early childhood, and as characterized by a
developmentally specific onset and trajectory. Distinct scoring criteria are outlined for each of
three prominent defense mechanisms scored using the DMM, beginning with least to most mature,
including: Denial (DEN), Projection (PRO) and Identification (IDEN). The DMM scoring system
was first developed and psychometrically standardized to differentiate diagnostic groups and
identify patient change during the course of a 15-month psychoanalytic psychotherapy treatment.
Results indicated that upon admission, psychotic patients scored higher on denial, and overall total
defenses used as compared to Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) patients. After 15 months of
treatment however, no differences were found between psychotic and BPD patients regarding total
defenses used, and which was largely related to a decrease in denial (and to a lesser extent,
projection and identification) among psychotic patients (Cramer, Blatt & Ford, 1988).
Denial. As outlined above, early psychoanalytic—including object relations—theorists
proposed Denial was among the most primitive and first defense mechanisms to emerge in
response to overwhelming internal or external experiences; as Anna Freud stated, “when we find
denial, we know that it is a reaction to external danger” (p. 109). According to Cramer (2000;
2015), Denial functions as the primary defense mechanism among children ages four to six; by
age seven though, it is predicted to decline and give way to increasingly mature defenses.
Functionally, Denial works by ‘turning away from’, ‘ignoring’ or ‘shutting out’ threatening or
overwhelming stimuli and is often accompanied by a false perception that the unpleasant event has
successfully been extinguished by psychic will alone.
As a single-step cognitive operation (e.g., acknowledge vs. ignore), Denial is not only the
least complex defense, but also the least amenable to accommodating adaptation or change.
Consequently, the use of denial often coincides with rigidity or inflexible behavior or is evidenced
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by difficulties with transitions and adapting to new or changed environments. Reduced use of
denial—including the overall frequency, and frequency as compared to use of other defenses—
represents a shift towards increased cognitive and affective flexibility. A capacity to explore,
tolerate and engage with new dimensions of the intra and interpersonal world is associated with
health in the developmental process (Cramer, 2015). Further, in extreme states of distress or
exposure to traumatic events, Haan (1977) suggests that some situations may benefit from, if not
demand, the use of denial; when beneficial, it serves such that a “part of the intersubjective reality
is not admitted and therefore cannot be assimilated” (p. 178). However, given that development
and growth require flexibility, reliance on Denial will eventually lose its utility, and may become
dysfunctional and maladaptive, unless also accompanied by the onset and increase of mature
defenses, as outlined below.
Projection. As intrapsychic capacities expand, new, and increasingly complex defenses
emerge. According to Cramer (2000), Projection (PRO) emerges after Denial, and is characteristic
of middle childhood. This developmental maturation represents one’s increased capacity to
acknowledge and take in the external environment. Inherently, Projection requires increasingly
complex cognitive capabilities—which were not present with Denial—beginning with one’s
ability to differentiate between internal and external stimuli. In addition, there is an establishment
of internal standards which thoughts and feelings are measured by, and ultimately, deemed
acceptable or unacceptable. Functionally, Projection works by removing disturbing thoughts or
feelings (which are now acknowledged, unlike with Denial), but are extracted from the self and
put into another. Consequently, one shields against negative internalized perceptions, and instead,
threats are externalized as if stemming from the outside environment, rather than experienced from
within.
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Identification. Finally, Identification (IDEN) is the most cognitively complex and
developmentally mature defense, within Cramer's DMM coding system and overall model (2001).
Unlike its predecessors, Identification is characterized by one’s ability to acknowledge, tolerate
and maintain contact with reality, rather than deny or distort it in some way. Further, identification
involves a change within the self. Functionally, identification relies on enduring mental
representations in order to differentiate between self and other and distinguish among many and
different “others,” so as to become more liked and/or admired by a group of admired individuals.
Identification promotes effective interpersonal communication and conflict resolution. Among
other outcomes, identification enhances one’s sense of security and belonging, and builds the
foundation for self-esteem (Cramer, 2000; 2010; 2015).
Psychiatric & Behavioral Symptoms: ADHD, Depression & Related Outcomes
Relative to the psychodynamic constructs and projective tests outlined above, psychiatric and
behavioral symptomatology exist along a wide spectrum of experiences, including externalizing,
internalizing and combined presentations. The following section outlines two specific symptom
domains and associated clinical instruments used to operationalize and measure externalization
and internalization—including: Depression and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD). As part of the current study, symptomatology was measured among children and
adolescents by way of self-report measures.
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). According to the current Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, 5th Edition (DSM-V), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is
characterized by a persistent pattern of inattentiveness, impulsivity and/or hyperactivity beginning
in childhood, which interferes with one’s development and/or functioning (APA, 2013; Danielson
et al., 2018). Classified as a Neurodevelopmental Disorder, the DSM-V outlines explicit diagnostic
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criteria based on a developmental and largely behavioral set of criteria first present in childhood
(prior to age twelve) across multiple settings (APA 2013). First, Inattentiveness reflects a
vulnerability to distraction or psychologically “wandering off”, lacking sustained focus and
persistence through a task, and results in disorganization (not from defiance or lack of
comprehension). Hyperactivity manifests as excessive and situationally inappropriate motor
activity (e.g., fidgeting), restlessness or talkativeness. Impulsivity refers to the desire for immediate
reward or difficulty delaying gratification, social intrusiveness (e.g., interrupting others) and
decision-making based on short- versus long-term consequences. According to the CDC (2018),
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is one of the three most commonly diagnosed
conditions among youth and is accurately diagnosed as early as age four with an average onset by
age eleven. Although varied, estimates suggest that approximately five percent of children and
two-and-a-half percent of adults across cultures meet criteria for ADHD, which is most often
identified during elementary school and remains relatively stable throughout adolescence. Both
early onset and severity of symptoms predict earlier diagnosis (APA, 2013).
Clinical Features & Comorbidity. In addition to the three criterion domains—inattentiveness,
hyperactivity and impulsivity—several associated traits or characteristics have been shown to cooccur with and/or exacerbate ADHD symptoms. These include: low frustration tolerance,
irritability or mood lability as well as increased risk for suicide attempts, primarily when comorbid
with mood, conduct and/or substance use disorders (Salmonsson, 2011). In addition, ADHD has
been associated with deficits in effortful behavioral control or constraint, increased negative
emotionality and novelty or sensation-seeking. Coupled with these temperamental traits, higher
rates of Conduct Disorder (CD) and Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) have been identified—
particularly among males—diagnosed with ADHD (Azerdero, Moreira & Barbosa, 2018). Further,
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males are diagnosed with ADHD twice or up to three times as often as females (APA, 2013).
Relatedly, females tend to present more often with inattentive symptoms, whereas males are more
likely to present with disruptiveness, impulsivity and hyperactivity, which in turn corresponds to
higher rates of treatment utilization. Yet overall, national survey results indicate that children and
adolescents are significantly more likely to receive treatment for ADHD related symptoms,
compared to other conditions (e.g., depression, anxiety) (Ghandour, Sherman, Vladutiu, Lynch,
Bitsko & Blumberg, 2019).
Empirical studies have revealed that while impulsivity, inattentiveness and hyperactivity may
present as part of other psychiatric symptoms and diagnoses, ADHD is arguably distinguished
from other psychiatric disorders (Lange et al., 2010). Longitudinal studies have shown that ADHD
and related symptoms are chronic rather than acute, and further, that ADHD is not a
developmentally-confined condition (Barkley, 2006; Lange et al., 2010).
Etiology & Risk Factors. According to the DSM-V (APA, 2013), no biological markers for
ADHD exist. However, studies revealed higher rates of ADHD symptoms among youth whose
parents also endorsed past or present ADHD symptom or diagnoses, where familial vulnerabilities
suggest an underlying genetic predisposition (Barkley, 2006; Lange et al., 2010; Rowland et al.,
2018). Further, neuroimaging studies suggested that underlying structural abnormalities in the
brain may contribute to ADHD symptoms, including smaller prefrontal-striatal networks in
children diagnosed with ADHD (Barkley, 2006). Other studies revealed that ADHD children have
slower EEG wave lengths, as well as decreased total brain volumes based on fMRI imaging. While
results revealed delayed maturation in posterior to anterior cortical development among ADHD
children (APA, 2013), other neuroanatomy studies revealed abnormalities in frontal-subcorticalcerebellar systems (Lange et al., 2010).
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Several studies have also identified familial and environmental factors which may be
implicated in ADHD among youth, including socioeconomic status and low birthweight (Lawson,
Nissley-Tsiopinis, Nahmias, McCongaughy & Eiraldo, 2017). Further, Wunster et al. (2019) used
latent growth analyses to predict risk and protective factors associated with ADHD in children and
adolescents, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Results revealed significantly higher rates
of ADHD symptoms among males, younger children, and those with greater parental mental health
problems; whereas improved family climate was associated with decreased ADHD symptoms
(Wunster et al., 2019). Relatedly, results from three prospective studies found that parental
rejection, parent-child relational and mother-child attachment problems in early childhood
significantly increased risk for ADHD among school-aged children (Lifford et al., 2008; Rochford,
2005; Skovgaard, 2010). Other cross-sectional studies found that higher rates of maternal insecure
attachment representations increased in tandem with children’s ADHD symptoms (Kissgen et al.
(2009).
History of Diagnosis & Diagnostic Criteria. Published in 1980, the DSM-III was the first to
introduce Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) (with or without hyperactivity) as a diagnosis based
on adaptations from earlier classifications (e.g., “Hyperkenetic Reaction in Childhood),
highlighting a shift towards the lack of impulse and attentional control featured as part of the
diagnosis (Lang et al., 2010). DSM-III also differed from the then-current International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-9), which emphasized the essentiality of hyperactivity to the
diagnosis. DSM-III introduced three domains for diagnostic criteria: 1) impulsivity, 2) inattention
and 3) hyperactivity. Domains included explicit numerical cutoff scores for symptoms, guidelines
for age of onset, specificity regarding duration of symptoms, as well as exclusion criteria for
differential diagnoses (Barkley, 2006). Interestingly, DSM III-R introduced a significant shift
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sustained throughout subsequent iterations of the diagnosis, such that ADD was dropped and
replaced with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The ADHD diagnosis then
utilized a single list of criteria and clinical cutoff scores and three subtypes: predominantly
inattentive, predominantly hyperactive/impulsive or combined type (APA, 2013; Lange et al.,
2010). Although DSM-IV and ICD-10 adopted similar criteria for each of the three ADHD
subtypes, the DSM-IV significantly lowered the threshold for criteria and was less demanding that
symptoms be cross-situational (e.g., home and school) (Lange et al., 2010).
Finally, the most recent DSM-V (APA, 2013) included multiple changes to diagnostic criteria
for ADHD which may have an impact on its clinical application and utility. Namely, specific
examples have been added to criterion items to “facilitate application across the life span” (APA,
2013, p. 62). Further, specifiers have replaced subtypes, comorbid Autism Spectrum diagnoses are
now allowed, and the symptom threshold was lowered for a clinical cut-off of five symptoms for
adults (as compared to six for children) (APA, 2013).
Current Diagnosis & Diagnostic Criteria. An on-going debate wages regarding accurate and
over-diagnosis of ADHD. Research conducted by Cotuono (1993) for example, revealed that out
of ninety-two children referred for specialized treatment services, only twenty-two percent were
given ADHD as a primary diagnosis, whereas thirty-seven percent received ADHD as a secondary
diagnosis. This suggests that affective and behavioral symptomology are often mislabeled or
misattributed by caregivers and adults. Relatedly, others have challenged core features of ADHD
as a diagnosis, and more specifically, the centrality of inattentiveness in ADHD, suggesting that
environmental (e.g., reinforcement) and individual factors (e.g., intrinsic motivation) may also
contribute to these underlying symptoms (Barkley, 2006).
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Diagnostic Instruments / Measures. Broadly, ADHD diagnoses are most often conferred once
a child’s presentation of inattentive, hyperactive and/or impulsive behaviors has met criteria, based
on clinical interviews with primary caregivers, reports from teachers and/or behavioral
observations of a child in a classroom or clinical setting (Achenbach et al., 1987). Across myriad
clinical settings, ADHD diagnoses are increasingly conferred based on outcomes from self-report
measures, as well as cross-informant comparisons (e.g., teacher, caregiver and child self-reports).
Numerous scoring systems and instruments exist for the clinical evaluation of ADHD and related
symptomology, including the Conners, 3rd Edition, comprised of multiple versions for collateral
informants (e.g., self, caregiver and teacher forms). This measure will be outlined in detail as part
of the Methods section below. Importantly and overall, diagnostic features of ADHD in the DSM
IV and V are primarily behavioral and only minimally consider the mental/psychological
experiences of individuals, which also fails to capture the full range of emotional experience (Silva
et al., 2012).
Depression. As a clinical phenomenon, depression among children and adolescents has been
a topic of debate, controversy, and public health concern, prompting decades of empirical
investigations and interventions targeting symptomatic youth. A recent report from the CDC
(2018) stated that approximately three percent (3.2%) of children in the United States carry a
diagnosis of, or related to, depression. Further, results from the National Surveys on Drug Use and
Health reported an eight to nine percent increase in rates of depression among 12-20-year-olds in
the U.S. between 2005 and 2014, even after controlling for substance use and sociodemographic
factors (Mojtabai, Olfson, & Han, 2016). Current estimates suggest that nearly one in ten youth
will experience a depressive episode by age sixteen, and among adolescents, acute and chronic
symptoms of depression are one of the leading causes of illness and disability. Suicide is also the
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third leading cause of death among youth ages 15-19, and remains an on-going focus of prevention
and treatment interventions (Granmaye pour, Nezhad, Sabooni & Mir Ahmadi, 2011).
Clinical Features & Comorbidities. According to the DSM-V, depression and related
disorders are characterized by a unique combination of internalized and externalized symptoms,
including both affective and behavioral presentations. Affectively, clinical depression and related
disorders are characterized by a low, sad or depressed mood (APA, 2013). In addition, somatic
complaints (e.g., fatigue), cognitions (e.g., excessive guilt), self-perceptions (e.g., sense of
worthlessness) and broad changes in overall cognitive functioning (e.g., concentration or
indecisiveness) are also indicators of depression (APA, 2013). Combined, these factors may
contribute to behavioral changes associated with clinical depression, including: social
isolation/withdrawal, disengagement from normal activities and events, and overall, significantly
inhibit one’s overall functioning (APA, 2013). Importantly, results from a 30-year longitudinal
study of depression across the lifespan revealed that depressed mood, sleep interference,
concentration disturbances, and suicidal ideation were common to depression across all ages,
although the characteristics and defining features appeared to change throughout development
(Carlson & Kashani, 1988).
Among child and adolescents, internalized features of depression, most often present with low,
depressed mood and sad affect, appear tearful and lethargic, report low energy and lost interest in
activities, hobbies or events (APA, 2013). Further, youth may evidence social and interpersonal
withdrawal, present as increasingly seclusive, express difficulty putting their experiences into
words, and struggle to make-decisions or maintain concentration. In contrast, externalizing
features of depression manifest as irritability, oppositionality and defiance, as well as other
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characteristics of affective and behavioral misconduct (Kempfer et al., 2017; Kranzler, Young,
Abela, Elias & Selby, 2016).
Early and contemporary researchers have suggested that due to developmental, individual and
environmental differences, depression symptoms in children and adolescents may also manifest
differently as compared to the affective and behavioral presentations of adults. For example,
depression symptoms among children ages 6-12 often included somatic complaints, such as
headaches, abdominal pain and stomach aches (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2003). Further, empirical
study results have suggested that sad appearance, low self-esteem and somatization declined with
age, whereas persistently sad affect, hopelessness and lethargy increased with age (Carlson &
Kashani, 1988). Depression symptoms among middle school aged children often include
restlessness, problem behaviors and flight to / from others, and may include features of
oppositionality and conduct problems, school difficulties, truancy and/or low performance
(Kempfer et al., 2017). Relatedly, difficulty tolerating routine and/or seeking constant stimulation
have been evidenced across age groups, as related to depression (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2003).
Further, evidence has suggested that early onset of depression in childhood may reflect greater
severity and increased likelihood of symptoms persisting into adolescence and young adulthood
(Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2003). Relatedly, Garland & Weiss (1995) have suggested that
depression may be a “bimodal” phenomenon in adolescence, such that the first onset of depression
symptoms during adolescence may be less severe and persistent, whereas childhood onset of
depression is often more severe and treatment resistant. Interestingly however, according to the
APA (2013), no significant differences in symptom onset emerged related to the phenomenology,
course or treatment of depression; relatedly, no clear age effects on the course of treatment have
been found. Consistent with a polydiagnostic theory of affective and behavioral symptoms,
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however, nearly three out of four children diagnosed with depression also carry another psychiatric
diagnosis (e.g., anxiety) and one out of two also experience behavioral problems (CDC, 2018).
Further, depression most often co-occurs with ADHD, Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) and
Conduct Disorder (CD) (APA, 2013). Combined, these factors lend further support for underlying
complex and intersecting systems involved in the affective, behavioral and cognitive aspects of
emotional (dys)regulation, including myriad sociobiological factors.
Etiology & Risk Factors. Empirical evidence from small and large-scale research studies have
identified factors unique to the vulnerability, etiology and progression of depression symptoms,
beginning with the earliest stages of development. Regarding neurological development, for
example, hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis hyperactivity has been the most extensively
researched abnormality related to major depression, and has been shown to be associated with
melancholia, psychosis and suicide risk. Further, fMRI studies have shown functional
abnormalities in neural systems associated with reward seeking and emotional processing /
regulation in depression (APA, 2013). Further, fMRI studies with infants of depressed teenage
mothers have shown significantly less left-brain activation, indicating less engagement with
approach-related emotions (e.g., happiness, interest and curiosity), relative to right-brain region
activation (associated with sadness and disgust) (Dawson, 1994). Combined, outcomes from past
and contemporary studies suggest short- and long-term neuropsychological consequences
associated with early and persistent clinical depression.
In addition to neurological factors, empirical research evidence has supported theories of
childhood depression and its associated symptoms from a sociobiological and schematic view.
Reynolds & Kemphaus (2003), for example, conceptualized clinical depression among youth as
related to difficulty assimilating new experiences into existing cognitive structures and limited
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cognitive flexibility to adapt with environmental demands (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2003).
Relatedly, empirical research increasingly investigates the underlying relationship between
depression symptoms and associations to other aspects of cognitive functioning, including:
processing speed, working memory and inhibitory control (Barch, Harms, Tillman & Hawkey,
2019). Further, deficits in executive functioning have been shown to exacerbate symptoms of
depression, including lack of control over negative and ruminative thoughts (Barch, Harms,
Tillman & Hawkey, 2019). Similarly, Hopkins, Gouze, Lavigne & Bryant (2019) revealed that
among a sample of preschool and kindergarteners, increased rates of depression were associated
with less effortful control and sensory regulation at age four.
Interestingly, results from a recent meta-analysis conducted by Kempfer and colleagues (2017)
revealed no differences in rates of depression according to youth’s biological sex. However, low
socioeconomic status and level of education were identified as factors associated with increased
depression among adolescents. Other recent studies however, indicated distinct trajectories and
risk for depression related to biological sex. A meta-analysis of national survey data in the U.S.
collected between 2009-2014 revealed significantly higher rates of cumulative depression among
adolescent females (36.1%) compared to males (13.6%), beginning at age twelve and increasing
through age seventeen, suggesting that sex differences may magnify over the course of
development (CDC, 2018). Further, results from a national prospective cohort study of young
adults in the U.S., revealed significantly higher rates of self-reported depression among
marginalized adolescents, including transgender and gender non-conforming (TGNC) individuals
specifically, compared to cis-gender males (Risner, Katz-Wise & Austin, 2016). Additionally,
familial and sociocultural, environmental and / or intergenerational factors impact rates of
depression among children and adolescents. For example, infants of depressed mothers have been
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shown to “mirror” their mothers’ behavior, including facial, verbal and physically expressive cues
(Field, 1984).
Diagnostic Instruments & Measurements. Myriad clinical tools, instruments and techniques
exist to evaluate depression among children and adolescents. Reliable tools to assess depression
in preschool and early-elementary-age children, however, have been slow to emerge, though
standardized instruments (e.g., self-report measures, clinical interviews and observer rating scales)
are abundantly available with pre- and adolescent populations (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2003).
Standardized self-report instruments, such as the Children’s Depression Inventory, 2nd Edition,
Self-Report [CDI-2, SR, (S)], which was used for the current study, are increasingly favored as
part of structured assessments for affective and behavioral symptoms, and will be further outlined
in the Methods section below.
Psychoanalytic & Psychodynamic Perspectives on Psychiatric Symptoms
Several theorists have expanded on psychoanalytic and drive-based theories and
conceptualized psychiatric symptoms as a function of implicit, intrapsychic processes which
contribute to psychological and emotional maturation. Psychoanalytic theorists and researchers
have explored underlying relationships between psychiatric symptomology (e.g., depression and
anxiety), accompanied cognitions and behaviors, and unconscious, emotion-regulation processes.
Beginning with Freud (1917), seminal psychoanalytic theorists have proposed psychiatric
symptomology (e.g., depression) resulting from implicit wishes, drives and unmet needs.
Depression. Since first proposed, underlying relationships between depression symptoms and
intrapsychic processes emphasized a common focus on depressive symptoms resulting from a
feeling of or fearing the loss of an important object first in infancy, and later on in future
relationships (Weiner & White, 1982). Freud (1917) first described an affective state of depression
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due to the loss of a ‘love object.' This loss resulted in feelings of longing, guilt (due to any negative
feelings towards the object) and anxiety due to the helplessness and wish to restore the lost state
of well-being, for which the object was essential (Sandler & Joffe, 1969). Relatedly, Winnicott
(1945) described depressed affect as a relational, dyadic phenomenon resulting when the infant’s
implicit wish to relieve a caregiver’s emotional suffering leads them to serve as a ‘container’ for
intolerable affective states. Object Relation theorists dispute the origins of depressive
symptomatology; some drive theorists suggest internal sources (e.g., Kleinian fantasy), whereas
others suggest an interaction between internal and external, reality-based experiences (e.g.,
Kernberg, 1976) (Herbert, McCormack & Callahan, 2010). Further, from a self-psychological
perspective, other psychoanalytic theorists (e.g., Kohut, 1971) have conceptualized depression as
a narcissistic disturbance wherein an unconscious, poor self-concept, results from grandiose and
unfulfilled expectations about the self. In addition to unstable or inflated self-esteem, disintegrated
ego functioning results from incoherent or disorganized self-other experiences, and further,
contribute to distorted perceptions of time and space (Kohut, 1966).
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Although relatively underdeveloped in the
psychoanalytic and psychodynamic literatures, a few contemporary theorists and researchers have
conceptualized ADHD symptoms and diagnosis as the outcome of unconscious emotional
dysregulation. Namely, Crittenden & Kultbotten (2007) suggested that ADHD may serve a “selfprotective” function, protecting against unsafety and attachment insecurity which interfere with a
child’s ability to organize their emotions around a specific danger. Further, Gilmore (2000)
suggested that ADHD results from a “disturbance in the synthetic, organizing and integrative
function of the ego” (p. 1261), including the capacity to regulate and modulate the balancing of
internal and external stimuli. Relatedly, Palombo (2001) described ADHD youth through a self-
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psychology lens, suggesting that overwhelmingly negative interactions with family and friends
interfere with a child’s developing “self-object functions” (p. 153), particularly the idealizing
function which promotes self-soothing and positive self-esteem. Sugarman (2006) also described
ADHD as a result of self-regulation difficulties, including aspects of narcissism and object
relational deficits, such that ADHD results from a failure to “balance and maintain a steady
equilibrium between the many mental processes and contents necessary for adequate selfregulation” (p. 237). Further, Carney (2002) added that interpersonal contexts further interfere
with an ADHD child’s capacity to “modulate states of arousal and to organize behavior in
meaningful, predicable ways” (p. 299).
From an Object Relations perspective, Rainwater (2007) suggests that ADHD symptoms
reflect a manic defense against one’s “emotionally intense inner reality” (p. 74); more specifically,
from unconscious depression or mourning, or the “terrifying forces in his inner or outer
experience” (Rainwater, 2007, p. 82). In particular, Rainwater (2007) asserted the flee from the
“excruciating emotions” evident in ADHD children represents a flight from aggression projected
onto the object which in turn, creates a fear of retaliation. Rainwater (2007) further suggested that
the resulting depressive guilt and need for the object’s restitution manifest in the child’s
restlessness and hyperactivity, which reflects an attempt to avoid and/or control the object and the
pain of their internal realities (Rainwater, 2007, p. 80). In contrast, Leuzinger-Bohleber &
Fischmann (2010) posit that ADHD symptoms result from the child’s harboring of “extreme
images of a hateful being” (p. 148), triggering aggression which is projected onto a (persecuting)
Other. Broadly, Salmonsson (2011) asserts the presence of a “bad, uncontaining internal object”
is often present and “easily awakened” during psychoanalytic treatment with ADHD youth and
further suggests that the child’s “temporal myopia” leads to panic without access to a real or
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internalized object (Barkley, 1996, p. 247). Combined, contemporary theorists have articulated
ADHD and related symptoms as the result of failed or insufficient mechanisms for self- and
interpersonal regulation, including one’s individual capacity to monitor and regulate emotions, and
further, independently self-soothe. However, relatively few empirical studies have used a
psychodynamic lens or instruments to examine ADHD and related psychological phenomenon.
Benczik (2005) administered the Children’s Apperception Test (CAT) with a group of latency age
males diagnosed with ADHD. Results indicated that compared to a control group, ADHD males
had “regressive tendencies”, difficulty maintaining “contact with reality”, increased negative
affection, and defenses poorly adapted to conflict resolution (e.g., higher rates of denial,
omnipotence, acting out and devaluation), poorly integrated egos and underdeveloped superegos.
Summary
Aims of the current study are multi-fold, with varied implications for the diagnosis, evaluation
and treatment of affective (e.g., depression, anxiety) and behavioral dysregulation (e.g.,
hyperactivity, inattentiveness) (Ghandour, Sherman, Vladutiu, Lynch, Bitsko & Blumberg, 2019).
Although not used as part of standard intake or psychological evaluations, research has suggested
that myriad factors—including those which are unconscious, as in, outside the realm of
awareness—contribute to individual and intersecting systems of emotional regulation, which in
turn, impacts one’s experience of distress, psychiatric symptoms, and overall ability to achieve
and maintain functioning. Further, outcomes from projective tests (e.g., RIM or TAT), have been
be validly and reliably used to operationalize and measure psychodynamic constructs which reflect
internal systems of emotion regulation, including: Affect Maturity (AM), Object Relations (OR)
and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs). Broadly, these processes have been theoretically and
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empirically linked to adaptive functioning, (un)healthy psychological development and the onset
and sequelae of psychiatric symptomology.
Overall, the current study first aims to characterize an often overlooked and underserved
clinical population of youth presenting for clinical services through a community-based mental
health clinic located in Harlem, New York. Results obtained from youth’s self-report psychiatric
symptoms, including depression [CDI-2, SR(S)] and ADHD (Conners—3, SR) are described.
Next, outcomes from the Rorschach Inkblot (RIM) and Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) are
described, based on results from multiple standardized instruments, including: Defense
Mechanism Manual (DMM; Cramer, 1990), Affect Maturity Scale (AMS; Thompson, 1981) and
Mutuality of Autonomy Scale (MOA; Urist, 1977). Finally, outcomes from self-report and
projective tests are synthesized to highlight underlying relationships between measures of
unconscious processes and affective and behavioral symptoms—or, emotion dysregulation. To
date, the present study is the first known to integrate results from youth’s self-report of depression
and ADHD symptoms with AM, OR and DMs scores.
Hypotheses
Outcomes from self-report and projective tests are synthesized to highlight underlying
relationships between measures of unconscious processes and affective and behavioral
symptoms—or, dysregulation. Hypotheses within the current study are largely exploratory,
although based on theoretical and empirical precedent as outlined in the Introduction section
above. Analyses in the subsequent Results section are based on the following hypotheses:
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A) Depression [CDI:SR(S)]:
a. Demographics: Youth’s Total Depression (DEP) T-scores will significantly increase
with age; that is, compared to younger youth, older youth will endorse more symptoms
of depression
b. Object Relations (OR): Higher (worse) Object Relations (OR) (MOA-M) scores will
associate with, and further, predict higher Total Depression (DEP) T-scores across youth
c. Affect Maturity (AMS): Higher Affect Maturity (AM) (AMS-M) scores will associate
with, and further, predict lower Total Depression (DEP) T-scores across youth
d. Defense Mechanisms (DMs):
i. Use of immature DMs (e.g., Denial) will associate with, and further, predict higher
Total Depression (DEP) T-scores across youth, particularly as Denial persists with
age (e.g., younger vs. older youth)
ii. Use of mature DMs (e.g., Identification) will associate with, and further, predict
lower Total Depression (DEP) T-scores across youth
B) ADHD & Related Outcomes (Conners 3—SR):
a. Demographics: Youth’s externalizing symptoms, including: Hyperactivity / Impulsivity
(HYP) and Defiance / Aggression (DEF) T-scores will significantly decrease with age,
that is, younger youth will endorse more externalized symptoms compared to older youth
b. Object Relations (OR): Higher (worse) Object Relations (OR) (MOA-M) scores will
associate with, and predict increased externalizing symptoms, including: Hyperactivity /
Impulsivity (HYP) and Defiance / Aggression (DEF) T-scores across youth
c. Affect Maturity (AMS): Lower Affect Maturity (AM) (AMS-M) scores will associate
with, and further, predict increased externalizing symptoms, including: Hyperactivity /
Impulsivity (HYP) and Defiance / Aggression (DEF) T-scores across youth
d. Defense Mechanisms (DMs):
i. Use of immature DMs (e.g., Denial) will associate with, and further, predict
increased externalizing symptoms, including: Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP) and
Defiance / Aggression (DEF) T-scores across youth
ii. Use of mature DMs, (e.g., Identification), will associate with and further predict
decreased externalizing symptoms including: Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP) and
Defiance / Aggression (DEF) T-scores across youth
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Methods
Data and results for the current study were gathered from a sample of children and adolescents
seeking psychological services at The Psychological Center—a community-based mental health
clinic located in West Harlem, New York. Located on the City College of New York (CCNY)
campus, The Psychological Center is staffed by in-training psychotherapists in the CCNY Clinical
Psychology doctoral program, who provide psychological services on a sliding-scale fee—
including mental health treatment and neuropsychological testing—for individuals across the
lifespan. In Fall 2016, the Child Health and Psychotherapy (CHAP) Program was implemented at
The Psychological Center, as part of a programmatic evaluation and on-going data collection
protocol with child and adolescent patients.
Participants
Participants in the current study included children and adolescents (ages 8—17 years)
presenting for clinical services, including psychotherapeutic and/or neuropsychological
evaluations between September 2016 and September 2019. Results and analyses were based on
information obtained from fifty-one children and adolescents. Inclusion criteria for the current
study required available self-report and projective test data from youth; all other cases were
excluded from analysis, as indicated by the tested hypotheses.
Procedures
CHAP Protocol: Youth. A child or adolescent (8 years and older) met with a clinician to
complete a baseline instrument (either paper-and-pencil or electronic) (the “Child Packet”), which
included a series of self-report questionnaires to assess psychiatric symptomatology (e.g.,
depression, ADHD) using standardized measures. Clinicians also administered projective
measures, including the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935) and the
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Rorschach Inkblot Measure (RIM; Rorschach, 1942) with the youth (6 years and older).
Assessments were completed with children and adolescents over the course of 1-3 sessions to
complete both self-report and projective measures.
Instruments
As noted, youth completed multiple standardized projective assessments that were later scored
based on manuals outlined for the constructs of interest as part of the current study, including the
Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM; Rorschach, 1942) and the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT;
Morgan & Murray, 1935) and scored using standardized measurements as outlined below.
Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM). As described above, the Rorschach Inkblot Method
(RIM) is a projective task premised on the notion that exposure to ambiguous stimuli—inkblots,
for instance—could stimulate unconscious activation and produce responses related to
intrapsychic phenomenon. Administration protocol for the RIM included presenting each of ten
cards, one at a time, and with the first card, prompting a respondent with the following phrase:
“I’m going to show you a card. There are no right or wrong answers. Why don’t you take a look
at it, take your time, and tell me what this could be?” (Tuber, 2012, p. 55). While other variations
of instructions and prompts are available, the prompt described above was intended to elicit
respondent’s fantasy and imaginative reveries, rather than emphasizing the visual-perceptual
qualities of the task (Tuber, 2012).
During RIM card administration, respondents were asked to elaborate on identified images in
two ways: 1) reviewing each card’s response and identifying the specific areas (or subareas) used
to create each figure, object, etc. and 2) revisiting responses which include an action (e.g., verb)
and prompting the respondent to clarify: “[verb]ing, as if?” In this way, an inquiry phase followed
the initial exposure to each card, using administration questions to identify the location (e.g., “Can
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you show me where you saw the X?”) and response determinants (e.g., “What made it look like
an X?”), which combined, reflected the shape and form of each response. Movement responses
however, (e.g., “the X is [verb]ing”) included an additional query to underscore links between
responses and one’s object relationships. Using the patient’s verbatim statements, movement
response queries were framed: “[verb]ing, as if?” (Tuber, 2012, p. 58). Extrapolation from
additional queries may not have emerged, however further illustration of the “as if” quality to
movement responses aimed to highlight activity/passivity and strengthen the contextual
understanding of movement responses (Tuber, 2012).
While the open-ended prompts described above may have expanded the overall range of
response quality or inadvertently produced a higher rate of “false positives” (e.g., more
pathological scores), the range of an individual’s scores was examined, followed by betweengroup comparisons, and finally, alongside results from other projective instruments (e.g., Thematic
Apperception Test). Although multiple scoring systems and constructs are measurable using RIM
responses, given the underlying hypotheses and scope of the current study, responses were only
scored based on measures of Object Relationships as outlined in the Urist Mutuality of Autonomy
Scale (MOA), described below (Urist, 1977).
Mutuality of Autonomy Scale (MOA). Urist’s (1977) Mutuality of Autonomy (MOA) Scale
emerged at the intersection of object relations, self- and ego psychology, emphasizing the
developmental transition toward separation-individuation based on RIM movement responses
(Kernberg: 1971, 2001; Kohut: 1966). Using the MOA scale, each RIM card was assigned one
MOA score ranging from 1-7, based on a spectrum of object relational heath (MOA1-7, scale point
1 = highest). Scale points 1 and 2 constitute the most adaptive scores in the scale, evidenced in
themes of reciprocal acknowledgement (MOA1) and benign, parallel interactions between figures
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(MOA2). Next, scale points 3 and reflect an emerging loss of autonomy between figures, such that
one may exist solely to “support” another (MOA3), or as a mirror for the other figure (MOA4).
Finally, scale points 5, 6 and 7 reflect loss of control over one’s separateness and increasing
coercion (MOA5), malevolence or violence (MOA6) or “larger than life” destruction (MOA7)
(Blatt, Tuber & Auerbach, 1990).
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). While the specificities of each card Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT) card are highly variable—including the content, context and
characters—the task intends to elicit information regarding underlying motivations, beliefs,
concerns and dimensions of one’s broader ‘world view.’ During the TAT test, each subject was
presented with a series of black and white images and tasked with generating a narrative using the
content and five prompts: 1) what is happening currently? 2) what led up to the current situation?
3) what will happen in the future? 4) what are the characters thinking? 5) what are they feeling?
Each story was evaluated based on thematic content, but also on the organization and construction
of each narrative, which have also been empirically linked to one’s overall quality of adjustment
(McGrew & Teglasi, 1990; Schafer, 1958). For the purpose of the current study, a standardized
battery of 10-12 TAT cards were presented to all child and adolescent participants, including cards:
1, 2, 3BM, 3GF, 4, 6BM, 7GF, 8BM, 12M, 13MF, 18GF, and 13B, chosen due to the range and
variety of thematic content. Some variation in the total and specific cards administered emerged
due to earlier protocol requirements related to the youth’s biological sex (i.e., certain cards were
selected or deselected due to specific themes or content: e.g., cards 6BM/7GF as well as 12M/18GF
were not always used together, but often substituted in or out on the aforementioned reasoning,
related to the biological sex of the child). Any protocols that did not include a minimum of 10
cards were excluded from this study and analyses.
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Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM). According to Cramer (1999), the Defense Mechanism
Manual (DMM) is a robust and clinically valid tool for evaluating use of defense mechanisms
based on results from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) (described above). Cramer
developed and tested clinical utility of the DMM (1999) based on two theoretical propositions: 1)
total defense mechanism scores should increase under conditions of stress and/or anxiety, and 2)
increased mature defense mechanism scores will be associated with decreased psychological
distress. When applied, the DMM provides a guideline for coding qualitative narratives for use of
three defense mechanisms: Denial (DEN), Projection (PRO) and Identification (IDEN)
(definitions and examples of each outlined below). Each of the three primary defense categories
(e.g., DEN, PRO and IDEN) also include seven scorable subtypes. All instances of defenses were
scored based on complete TAT protocols, given that a single narrative may have included multiple
codeable responses. Cumulative, proportional defense use scores were calculated for each of the
three defense categories. This method was chosen in light of empirical precedents (e.g., Cramer,
2001; Gray, 2018), and intended to limit any potential influence of variable defensiveness resulting
in short versus long narratives.
Affect Maturity Scale (AMS). The Affect Maturity Scale (AMS; Thompson, 1981) as
described above, is a systematic scoring system used to assess aspects of self- and overall
emotional regulation along a developmental continuum. As applied to narrative results obtained
using the TAT, outcomes were based on specific criteria outlined in the AMS scoring system,
which can be used to differentiate affective experiences across a continuum of immaturity to
maturity, ranging from 1-5 (with a score of 5 representing the most affective maturity measurable)
(Thompson, 1981). The AMS scoring system was applied to each TAT narrative, resulting in one
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score per card, however a score of 0 was given if no affect was present an average AMS score was
then calculated based on responses across cards (detailed further below) (Thompson, 1981).
Children’s Depression Inventory, Self-Report Short Form [CDI-2: SR(S)]. Youth’s
depression symptoms were assessed using the Children’s Depression Inventory Self-Report Short
Form [CDI-2: SR(S)], a standardized, self-report measure used with youth ages 7-17 and robust
psychometric properties, including both reliability and validity (Figuras, Amador-Campos,
Gomez-Benito & del Barrio Gandara, 2010). The CDI-2: SR(S) is a 12-item, paper-and-pencil or
electronically administered instrument, in which respondents select one out of three possible
statements to best describe their experience during the past two weeks. For example, respondents
selected one from the following statements to best characterize their overall level of fatigue: (1) I
am tired once in a while, (2) I am tired many days, (3) I am tired all the time. Each
statement/selection corresponds to a preset score ranging from 0-2 (maximum score = 24) (several
indicated items were reverse scored).
Individual item responses were converted from raw to standardized T-scores (M = 50, SD =
10) based on a two-part stratification including: biological sex (female or male) and age group
classification (Younger: 7-12, Older: 13-17 years), resulting in four discrete groups. These include:
1) younger females, 2) older females, 3) younger males, and 4) older males. Further, Total
Depression (DEP) T-scores corresponded to one of four classifications, including: (1) Average or
Lower (40 or below – 59T), (2) High Average (60 – 64T), (3) Elevated (65 – 69T) or (4) Very
Elevated (70 – 90T and above). According to the CDI-2, SR(S) scoring manual (Kovacs, 2011),
a T-score in the Very Elevated range is likely to indicate an area of significant clinical concern
(greater than or equal to 2 standard deviations above the mean), whereas a T-score in the Elevated
range usually indicates significant concerns (e.g., 1.5-2 standard deviations above the mean). High
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Average scores require careful consideration, being on the border between typical and atypical
levels of concern. T-scores below 60 indicate typical or absent concerns for youth given their age
and biological sex.
Conners Third Edition—Self-Report (Conners 3—SR). The Conners Third Edition—SelfReport (Conners 3—SR) form is a standardized, self-report measure used to assess the presence
and severity of symptoms of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and comorbid
symptomatology among children and adolescents ages 8-17. Results from the Conners—3 SR do
not include a total/composite score. Instead, total raw scores are summed and correspond to one
of five discrete domains, including: (1) Inattention (INT), (2) Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP),
(3) Learning Problems (LP), (4) Defiance / Aggression (DEF), and (5) Family Relationships
(FAM). Psychometrically, the Conners 3—SR has well-established reliability and validity and
includes three imbedded measures of viability within the instrument (Gallant, 2007).
The Conners 3—SR, is a paper-and-pencil or electronically administered instrument. For each
of the 99-items, respondents select from one of four Likert scale points to best describe their
experiences within the past month, ranging from: (0) Not at all (Never/Seldom), (1) Just a little
(Occasionally), (2) Pretty much (Often, Quite a bit) and (3) Very much (Very often, Very
frequently). Raw scores from each domain were converted to standardized T-scores (M = 50, SD
= 10), stratified by biological sex (male/female) and age (between 8-17). Standardized T-scores
correspond to one of five clinical classifications, including: 1) Low 40T or below), 2) Average
(40-59T), 3) High Average (60-64T), 4) Elevated Score (65-69T) or 5) Very Elevated (70T or
above). A T-score in the Very Elevated range is likely to indicate an area of significant clinical
concern (>/= 2 standard deviations above the mean), whereas a T-score in the Elevated range
usually indicates significant concerns (e.g., 1.5-2 standard deviations above the mean).
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Results
The current study explores underlying relationships between psychiatric symptoms (e.g.,
depression, ADHD) and unconscious processes involved in affective and behavioral regulation.
Outcomes are based on data obtained from a clinical sample of children and adolescents presenting
for psychological services as a community-based clinic in Harlem, New York. Psychiatric
symptoms were assessed using psychometrically robust self-report instruments, including:
depression (Children’s Depression Inventory, 2nd Edition [CDI-2: SR(S)]) and ADHD and related
outcomes (Conners-3rd Edition Self-Report (Conners 3—SR). Regarding measures of unconscious
processes, Affect Maturity (AM) was measured using Thompson’s Affect Maturity Scale (AMS)
(1981), capturing qualitative differences in emotional maturation using TAT narratives. Next,
defense mechanisms (DMs)—including Denial (DEN), Projection (PRO) and Identification
(IDEN)—were also measured based on results from the TAT using Cramer’s Defense Mechanisms
Manual (DMM) (1999), which suggests developmentally distinct timelines for emergence and
predominance with each defense. Finally, results from the Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM) were
used to score youth’s Object Relations (OR) based on Urist’s (1977) Mutuality of Autonomy
(MOA) Scale, which classifies RIM scores across a spectrum of health according to the quality of
one’s internalized object relationships.3
The following section begins with a descriptive overview of sample demographics, followed
by outcomes from youth’s self-report measures of Depression [CDI-2: SR(S)] and ADHD &
Related Outcomes (Conners 3—SR), which will be explored individually and as related to youth’s
age, biological sex, and other co-occurring symptoms. Next, an overview of outcomes from
projective tests used to measures three unconscious phenomena will be reviewed, including:

3

Due to unscoreable or missing results, the total N for analyses may be lower than the population total (N = 51), as
indicated throughout.
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Object Relations (OR), Affect Maturity (AM) and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs) will be
reviewed, and underlying relationships between constructs will also be explored as related to
youth’s biological sex and age. Finally, outcomes from self-report measures, including depression,
and ADHD symptoms will be explored as related to measures of OR, AM and DMs. Preliminary
statistical analyses were used to test hypothesized relationships between measures of unconscious
phenomenon and self-reported (conscious) psychiatric symptoms; follow-up / clarifying analyses
were applied and reported as indicated.
Demographic Characteristics
Information regarding sample demographics (e.g., youth’s age and biological sex) were
obtained from caregivers during the initial CHAP questionnaire completed at the time of intake
for clinical services; information is outlined in Table 1.1 below. All youth in the current sample
(N = 51) were between ages 8 and 17 (M = 11.27, SD = 2.38); further, based on categorical
groupings (and as defined by the [CDI-2: SR(S)], results indicated youth in the Older group (Ages
13 – 17) (n = 19) were significantly older (M = 13.95, SD = 1.18) as compared to Younger (Ages
8 – 12) (n = 32) (M = 9.69, SD = 1.15) in the current sample, (t(49) = -12.69, p < .001). Further,
fifty three percent of youth were identified as male, forty seven percent as female.4 Youth were
identified as racially diverse, including: ‘Mixed Race’ (n = 15, 33.1%), White (n = 15, 33.1%),
and Black (n = 14, 31.1%), and lastly, South/Southeast Asian (n = 1, 2.2%). Regarding ethnicity
(N = 47), youth were predominantly identified as Latino/Hispanic (n = 12, 25.5%), followed
equally by Black/African American (n = 10, 21.3%) and Racially/Ethnically Mixed (n = 10,

4

Information regarding youth’s biological sex was based on caregiver report; no children in the sample were identified
as intersex, another biologically based label, or transgender/gender non-conforming. As a result, outcomes will be
presented based on a binary model, reflecting a broader limitation of the study and clinical self-report measures overall.
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21.3%), then European American (n = 6, 12.8%), Western European (n = 5, 10.6%), African (n =
2, 4.3%), Caribbean Non-Latino (n = 1, 2.2%) and Central/Eastern European (n = 1, 2.2%).
Table 1.1: Youth Demographics & Characteristics, Descriptives
All
Mean
(SD)

N = 51
11.27
(2.38)

Biological Sex
Females
Males
(24)
(27)
11.88
10.78
(2.29)
(2.36)

Age Group
Younger
(32)
9.69
(1.15)

Older
(19)
13.95
(1.18)

Unconscious Constructs, Projective Tests
Regarding measures of unconscious processes, outcomes were obtained from two clinicianadministered and scored projective measures, including the: 1) Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)
and 2) Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM). Standardized, validated coding systems were used to
evaluate multiple unconscious and intrapsychic processes using the TAT and RIM, as outlined
below.
Object Relations. Results from the Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM) were scored for aspects
of youth’s ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations—or Object Relations—using the Urist (1977)
Mutuality of Autonomy Scale (MOA). In line with MOA scale scoring procedures, all scorable
responses (including human, animal and inanimate character interactions) were assigned a MOA
score across a continuum of ‘health’ ranging from (1) mutual, empathic relatedness, to (7) themes
of malevolent engulfment/interactions between characters (Blatt, Tuber & Auerbach, 1990).
Average MOA (MOA-M) scores were calculated based on an individual’s cumulative MOA scores
across all cards, divided by the total RIM cards used (Range: 1 – 10), and reflect an individual's
‘typical’ quality of interpersonal relatedness.5 A score of ‘0’ was designated to any response which

5

The MOA-M is considered the most robust and frequently used score within MOA research (Fowler & Erdberg,
2005; Graceffo et al., 2014), however the modal and score ranges have also used to identify significant betweengroup differences (e.g., Tuber, 1983).
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could not be scored for affect. Regarding all scorable responses for scale points 1—7, Table 1.2
below outlines the frequencies observed from the entire sample (N = 121 scorable responses):
Table 1.2: Urist MOA Scale Points 1—7, Frequencies
Urist (1977) Scale Point
1
18
14.91

Frequency
% Total

2
25
20.66

3
10
8.26

4
27
22.31

5
10
8.26

6
19
15.70

7
1
0.83

Broadly, and as outlined in Table 2.1 below, average MOA scores (MOA-M) among youth in
the current sample (N = 46) fell between the MOA3 and MOA4 range (M = 3.32, SD = 1.25).
Across the entire sample, no significant differences in MOA-M scores were identified between
females (n = 22) (M = 3.05, SD = 1.17) and males (n = 24) (M = 3.62, SD = 1.29) (t(44) = 1.56, p
= .13), nor between younger (n = 29) (M = 3.33, SD = 1.30) and older youth (n = 17) (M = 3.32,
SD = 1.21). Further, age was not significantly correlated with MOA-M scores across the entire
sample (N = 46) (r(44) = -.08, p = .61), nor were there differences across groups based on
biological sex (females: r(20) = .04, p = .84, males: r(22) = -.10, p = .67); no further analyses were
conducted as a result. Regarding the overall MOA score range, however, results across the sample
indicated that males had a wider and lower range [MOA1-MOA7] compared to females [MOA1MOA5]; whereas MOA6 scores were indicated among males in the sample, the lowest MOA score
found among females was in the MOA5 range.
Table 2.1: Mutuality of Autonomy (MOA) Scale, Descriptives
Biological Sex
All

Mean
(SD)

N = 46
3.32
(1.25)

Age Group

Sex x Age Group
Females

Males

Females

Males

Younger

Older

Younger

Older

Younger

Older

(22)
3.05
(1.17)

(24)
3.62
(1.29)

(29)
3.33
(1.30)

(17)
3.32
(1.21)

(13)
2.98
(1.31)

(11)
3.14
(1.05)

(16)
3.61
(1.26)

(6)
3.65
(1.50)
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Affect Maturity. Next, youth’s TAT responses were scored for Affect Maturity based on the
five-point Affect Maturity Scale (AMS, Thompson, 1981). Each TAT card response was assigned
an Affect Maturity score (AMS) based on the corresponding classifications ranging from 1) most
Primitive to 5) Most Mature affective response; a score of ‘0’ was assigned when no scorable
affective event occurred. Across the entire sample (N = 50), average AMS scores (AMS-M) fell
between the Level II and III scale point range (M = 2.28, SD = .68). Further, results indicated
AMS-M scores significantly increased with age (r(48) = .40, p <.001), and on average, were
significantly higher among older (n = 18) (M = 2.65 SD = .54) versus younger youth (n = 32) (M
= 2.08, SD = .67) (t(48) = -3.13, p < .01). Follow-up linear regression results indicated a main
effect for age (β = .40, SE = .04) in predicting higher AMS-M scores (F(1, 48) = 9.18, p < .05, R2
= .17), such that age accounted for 16.9% of variance in total AMS-M scores within the current
sample. In addition to age-based differences, outcomes revealed significantly higher AMS-M
scores among females (n = 24) (M = 2.49, SD = .63) versus males (n = 26) (M = 2.09, SD = .68)
(t(48) = -2.17, p < .05), regardless of age. A 2x2 ANOVA was used to follow-up on AMS-M
differences according to age and biological sex as described above. Overall, results revealed
significant between group differences (F(3,46) = 4.94, p < .01); Tukey Post-hoc follow-up analyses
revealed significantly higher AMS-M scores among older females (n = 11) (M = 2.66, SD = .44)
compared to younger males (n = 19) (M = 1.89, SD = .56), although no other significant betweengroup differences emerged.
Table 3.1: Affect Maturity Scale (AMS), Descriptives
Biological
Sex
All

Mean
(SD)

Age
Group

Sex x Age Group
Females
Males
Younger Older Younger Older

Females

Males

Younger

Older

N = 50

(24)

(26)

(32)

(19)

(13)

(11)

(19)

(7)

2.28
(.68)

2.49
(.63)

2.09
(.68)

2.08
(.67)

2.65
(.54)

2.35
(.74)

2.66
(.44)

1.89
(.56)

2.65
(.71)
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Next, Table 3.2 below displays outcomes obtained using SPSS PROCESS 3.4 to run a multiple
linear regression and follow-up on results described above. Outcomes indicated that in the model
predicting average Affect Maturity scores (AMS-M), biological sex moderated the relationship
between age and AMS-M, such that AMS-M scores were significantly higher among females (n =
24) compared to males regardless of age, however no significant differences emerged across
females according to age group (e.g., younger versus older). Further, while lower than females,
AMS-M scores among males (n = 26) significantly increased with age (β = .31, SE = .12, t(49) =
2.59) (F(3, 46) = 5.29, R2 = .26); no significant interaction effect was present (β = -.14, SE = .08).
Table 3.2: AMS: Biological Sex and Age Predict AMS-M, Multiple Linear Regression

(Constant)
Age
Biological Sex
(Interaction)

R2

F

(df)

β

SE

t

p-value

.257

5.289

(3, 46)

-1.60

1.341

-1.193

.003**

(1, 46)

.313
1.877
-.142

.121
.879
.078

2.590
2.134
-1.853

.01**
.04*
.07

Defense Mechanisms. Youth’s responses to the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) were also
scored for use of three Defense Mechanisms (DMs), including: 1) Denial (DEN), 2) Projection
(PRO), and 3) Identification (IDEN), based on the Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM)
procedures and scoring criteria (Cramer, 1991). Defense score proportions were calculated for
each defense type (e.g., Denial: DM Total) to account for variance inherent in the total number of
scorable responses.
As outlined in Table 4.1 below, results from a paired-samples t-test for the entire sample (N =
48) indicated that Denial (DEN) (M = .41, SD = .17) was the most predominant defense mechanism
used by youth in the sample. Outcomes indicated that youth used DEN significantly more than
Projection (PRO) (M = .33, SD = .13, t(46) = 2.09, p < .05) or Identification (IDEN) (M = .26, SD
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= .13, t(46) = 4.08, p < .001), and further, significantly more PRO than IDEN (t(46) = 2.61, p <
.05). Additionally, results across the entire sample (N = 48) indicated no significant relationship
between youth’s age and proportionate use of Defense Mechanisms, including: DEN (r(46) = -.23,
p = .11), PRO (r(48) = .07, p = .67), and IDEN (r(48) = .23, p = .12). Finally, outcomes from an
independent samples t-test indicated no significant differences in proportionate use of any defense
according to youth’s age group (Younger, n = 30, Older, n = 18), including: DEN (t(46) = .80, p =
.43), PRO (t(46) = .61, p = .55) and IDEN (t(46) = -.16, p = .11); no further analyses were
conducted based on results described above.
Next, as outlined in Tables 4.1 & 4.2 below, analyses also indicated no significant differences
in use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs) according to youth’s biological sex (Females, n = 22, Males,
n = 26), including: DEN (Females: M = .37, SD = .14, Males: M = .44, SD = .18, F(1, 46) = 2.12,
p = .15) and PRO (Females: M = .33, SD = .14, Males: M = .34, SD = .13, F(1, 46) = .04, p = .85).
However, IDEN was significantly higher among females (M = .30, SD = .13) compared to males
(M = .22, SD = .12) (F(1, 46) = 4.22, p < .05).
Table 4.1: Defense Mechanisms (DMs) by Age Group & Biological Sex, Descriptives
Biological
Sex

Age
Group

Sex x Age Group
Females
Younger
Older

Males
Younger
Older

All

Females

Males

Younger

Older

(DMs):
DEN

N = 48
.41 (.17)

(22)
.37 (.12)

(26)
.44 (.18)

(30)
.43 (.17)

(18)
.39 (.15)

(11)
.37 (.14)

(11)
.38 (.15)

(19)
.46 (.19)

(7)
.39 (.16)

PRO

.33 (.13)

.33 (.14)

.34 (.13)

.34 (.13)

.32 (.13)

.36 (.11)

.29 (.15)

.33 (.14)

.35 (.08)

IDEN

.26 (.13)

.30 (.13)

.22 (.12)

.23 (.14)

.32 (.11)

.27 (.16)

.32 (.10)

.21 (.12)

.25 (.11)

Finally, Table 4.2 below outlines relationships identified between use of specific defense
mechanisms across the entire sample and within specific groups. First, and consistent with
predictions, results across the entire sample (N = 48) indicated significant inverse correlations
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between Denial (DEN) and Projection (PRO) (r(46) = -.64, p < .01), as well as between DEN and
Identification (IDEN) (r(46) = -.63, p < .01). In contrast however, PRO and IDEN were not
significantly correlated (r(46) = -.20, p = .18).
Next, correlations between DMs were rerun to identify between group differences according
to biological sex. Outcomes among females (n = 22), revealed significant inverse correlations
between DEN and PRO (r(20) = -.53, p < .01), and DEN and IDEN (r(20) = -.52, p < .01), however,
PRO was also significantly and inversely correlated with IDEN (r(20) = -.45, p < .05). Overall,
results among males only (n = 26) revealed stronger, inverse correlations between DEN and use
of mature defenses, including both PRO (r(24) = -.78, p < .001) and IDEN (r(24) = -.70, p < .001),
but no significant relationship emerged between PRO and IDEN (r(24) = -.05, p = .80).
Table 4.2: Defense Mechanisms (DMs): DEN, PRO & IDEN, Correlations
Defense Mechanism (DMs)

All

N = 48

DEN x PRO

DEN x IDEN

PRO x IDEN

-.636**

-.630**

-.197

-.517**
-.695***

-.447*
.053

Females
(22)
-.533**
(26)
-.775***
Males
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001

Interactions: AMS-M, MOA-M & DMs (DEN, PRO & IDEN). Hypotheses and predicted
outcomes for the current study drew on theoretical and empirical precedents to identify appropriate
analyses and test predicted relationships between measures of unconscious processes. Analyses
were conducted using outcomes from the following measures and constructs: Object Relations
(OR, MOA-M), Affect Maturity (AM, AMS-M) and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs: DEN,
PRO, IDEN) across the entire sample, and as related to youth’s age group (e.g., younger vs. older)
x biological sex (i.e., female or male).

65

As outlined in Table 5.1 below, outcomes from the entire sample (N = 46) indicated no
significant correlations between Object Relations (OR) (MOA-M) scores and other unconscious
processes, including: AMS-M (r(44) = .05, p = .75) and all DMs: Denial (DEN) (r(44) = -.07, p =
.66), Projection (PRO) (r(48) = .13, p = .41) and Identification (IDEN) (r(44) = -.03, p = .84).
Next, regarding average AMS scores and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs), results from the
entire sample (N = 48) indicated a significant inverse correlation with Denial (DEN) (r(46) = -.43,
p < .01) even after controlling for age (r(45) = -.37, p <.01). AMS-M scores were positively
correlated with IDEN (r(46) = .50, p < .001), even after controlling for age (r(45) = .46, p < .001).
However, no relationship between AMS-M scores and PRO emerged (r(46) = .04, p = .77).
Regression analyses were used to further examine predictive relationships based on results
above. First, outcomes indicated a main effect for AMS-M in predicting greater use of IDEN (β =
.50, SE = .02, t(47) = 3.95, F(1, 46) = 15.63, p < .001, R2 = .25). To a lesser extent and inversely,
AMS-M scores also predicted less use of DEN (AMS-M: β = -.43, SE = .03, t(46) = -3.21, F(1,
46) = 10.32 p < .05, R2 = .18); however, AMS-M scores did not significantly predict use of PRO.
Table 5.1: MOA-M, AMS-M & DMs, Correlations
MOA-M

Defense Mechanisms (DMs)
DEN
PRO
IDEN
-.068
.128
-.032
-.428**
.044
.504***

AMS-M

N = 48
MOA-M
.048
AMS-M
.048
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001

Next, Table 5.2 below outlines results from unconscious constructs according to biological
sex. Regarding Object Relations (OR), average MOA scores among females (n = 22) did not
significantly correlate with any other unconscious measures or outcomes, including: AMS-M
(r(22) = .20, p = .34), or any defense mechanism, including: DEN (r(22) = .22, p = .33), PRO
(r(22) = -.07, p = .77), or IDEN (r(22) = -.14, p = .52). Similarly, outcomes among males (n = 26)
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revealed only one significant relationship: worse (unhealthier) Object Relations (OR, MOA-M)
scores inversely correlated with Denial (DEN) (r(24) = -.43, p < .05), however all other results
were non-significant (AMS-M: (r(24) = .05, p = .82, DMs: PRO: (r(24) = .33, p = .14, and IDEN:
(r(24) = .30, p = .18). Regarding Affect Maturity (AMS-M) scores, outcomes among females (n =
22) revealed a positive correlation between AMS-M and IDEN (r(22) = .48, p < .05), but not with
DEN (r(22) = -.35, p = .12) or PRO (r(22) = -.10, p = .66). However, among males (n = 26), results
AMS-M inversely correlated with DEN (r(24) = -.41, p < .05) and positively correlate with IDEN
(r(24) = .43, p < .05), but not with PRO (r(24) = .18, p = .39). Based on hypotheses of the current
study, no further analyses were used to follow-up.
Table 5.2: MOA-M, AMS-M & DMs, Correlations by Biological Sex
MOA-M

MOA-M

Defense Mechanisms (DMs)

AMS-M

DEN

PRO

IDEN

(F)

(M)

(F)

(M)

(F)

(M)

(F)

(M)

(F)

(M)

(22)

(26)

(22)

(26)

(22)

(26)

(22)

(26)

(22)

(26)

-

-

.202
-

.053
-

.219

-.427*

-.065

.330

-.144

.303

-.350

-.411*

-.100

.178

.484*

.431*

AMS-M
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001

Psychiatric Symptoms, Self-Report Measures
Information below outlines results from youth’s self-report measures used to assess
psychiatric symptoms, including both affective and behavioral presentations. In addition to results
from the sample overall, age and/or sex-specific results will be outlined to highlight significant
differences between groups, and follow-up analyses included as indicated.
Depression [CDI-2: SR(S)]. Total Depression (DEP) T-scores are based on responses to the
12-item Children’s Depression Inventory—2nd Edition, Self-Report, Short-Form [CDI-2: SR(S)].
Raw scores (Range: 0-2) were converted to standardized T-scores based on biological sex (i.e.,
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female or male) and age (Younger: ages 8-12, Older: ages 13-17) based norms. Total DEP T-scores
(Mean = 50, SD = 10) correspond to one of four clinical classifications: 1) Average or Lower (≤
40 – 59T), 2), High Average (60 – 64T), 3) Elevated (65 – 69T) or 4) Very Elevated (70 – 90T or
above). In addition to outcomes for the entire sample, significant relationships related to biological
sex (e.g., females or males) and age are also explored; further, where indicated, age group
comparisons corresponding to results from the CDI-2:SR(S) are also incorporated for analysis
(e.g., Younger / Older) and reported.
Total Depression (DEP) T-scores. As outlined in Table 6.1 below, average Total Depression
(DEP) T-scores among the entire sample (N = 51) fell within the Elevated range, according to selfreport outcomes, and as compared to a non-clinical, normed population (M = 66.51, SD = 9.42).
Overall, DEP T-scores did not significantly differ between females (n = 24) (M = 66.38, SD =
10.09) and males (n = 27) (M = 66.63, SD = 8.97) (t(49) = .10, p = .92). However, as predicted,
DEP T-scores were significantly higher among older (n = 19) (M = 70.95, SD = 10.48) versus
younger youth (M = 63.88, SD = 7.75) (t(49) = 3.21, p < .05) and overall, significantly correlated
with age (r(50) = .31, p < .05). Results from a follow-up linear regression analysis further revealed
that age (older) (β = 1.24 SE = .54, t(48) = 2.31, p < .05) was a significant predictor of youth’s
DEP T-scores (F(1, 49) = 5.35, p < .05) and accounted for 30.9% of total score variance (F(1, 49)
= 5.35, p < .05, R2 = .31). in youth’s Total DEP T-scores.
Table 6.1: Children’s Depression Inventory [CDI-2: SR(S)], Descriptives
All

Biological Sex

Mean (SD)

N = 51
66.51 (9.42)

Females
(24)
66.38 (10.09)

Classification

2.71 (1.17)

2.08 (.95)
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Males
(27)
66.63 (8.97)
2.67 (1.18)

Age Group
Younger
Older
(32)
(19)
63.88 (7.75) 70.95 (10.48)
2.44 (1.05)

3.16 (1.26)

While no specific differences were predicted based on biological sex, Table 6.2 below outlines
results from a 2x2 analysis of variance (ANOVA), which was used to follow-up significant
between group differences described above. Tukey Post-Hoc follow-up results indicated
significantly higher DEP T-scores among older females (M = 73.27, SD = 8.25) compared to
younger females (M = 63.88, SD = 7.75) (t(22) = -3.93, p < .001), but no other significant
differences emerged across groups. A multiple linear regression was used to follow up on
significant results. In the model predicting average DEP T-scores, outcomes revealed a main effect
for biological sex (β = -.28.83, SE = 12.40 (t(46) = -2.32, p < .05), although the effect for age was
non-significant (β = -2.18, SE = 1.65, (t(46) = -1.32, p = .19), however a significant interaction
effect emerged (β = 2.39, SE = 1.07, (t(46) = 3.33, p < .05). Further examination of conditional
effects at focal predictor values (e.g., females versus males DEP T-scores across ages), revealed a
significant increase in DEP T-scores with age among females, whereas no change was indicated
among males (F(3, 47) = 4.45, p < .05).
Table 6.2: Children’s Depression Inventory [CDI-2: SR(S)], Descriptives by Age & Biological Sex
Biological Sex
Females
N=
Mean (SD)
Classification

Younger
(11)
60.54 (7.61)
3.55 (.93)

Males
Older
(13)
73.27 (8.25)
2.08 (.95)

Younger
(19)
66.16 (7.17)
2.68 (1.06)

Older
(8)
67.75 (12.84)
2.63 (1.51)

Depression Summary. Overall, and regardless of chronological age, outcomes across youth
indicate that children and adolescents in the current sample endorsed elevated rates of depression
symptoms compared to their non-clinical peers. Importantly however, outcomes from the current
sample of children and adolescents reflected comparable rates of symptoms as reported among
other service-seeking populations (Moitabi, Olfson & Jan, 2016). Across the entire sample (N =
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51), DEP T-scores were significantly higher among older versus younger youth and overall,
significantly increased with age. Although a cross-sectional sample, follow-up analyses revealed
significant main effects for age moderated by biological sex, such that DEP T-scores significantly
increased among females with age, whereas no similar effect emerged among males. Finally,
results revealed that DEP T-scores among adolescent females, who endorsed the highest rates of
depression symptoms (ages 13-17) fell with the Very Elevated range and were significantly higher
compared to preadolescent females (ages 8 – 12), but no other between-group differences emerged.
ADHD & Related Outcomes (Conners 3—SR). Multiple psychiatric and psychosocial
outcomes were assessed using the 99-item Conner’s 3rd Edition, Self-Report (Conners 3—SR).
Outcomes for each subscale, including: 1) Inattentiveness (INT), 2) Hyperactivity / Impulsivity
(HYP), 3) Learning Problems (LP), 4) Defiance / Aggression (DEF), and 5) Family Relationships
(FAM). Raw scores were converted to standardized T-scores (M = 50, SD = 10) based on biological
sex (female or male) and age-based norms (ages 8 - 17) for each of the five subdomains listed
above. Standardized T-scores each correspond to a clinical score classifications, including: 1) Low
or Below Average (40T or below), 2) Average (40-59T), 3) High Average (60-64T), 4) Elevated
Score (65-69T) or 5) Very Elevated (70T or above); see Tables 7.1 and 7.2 below for an overview
of sample descriptives, which will each be outlined below.

Table 7.1: ADHD & Related Outcome Scores (Conners 3—SR), Descriptives
Age Group

Biological Sex
Mean (SD)
INT
HYP
DEF
LP
FAM

All

Females

Males

Younger

Older

N = 51
61.55 (13.03)
60.00 (11.63)
55.55 (12.51)
58.73 (10.15)
54.27 (11.38)

(24)
60.25 (15.08)
55.50 (10.69)
54.58 (12.39)
59.13 (11.54)
54.08 (12.29)

(27)
62.70 (11.67)
64.00 (11.13)
56.41 (12.78)
60.00 (9.95)
54.44 (10.73)

(32)
63.06 (13.46)
63.00 (10.17)
56.59 (13.88)
59.19 (10.57)
54.09 (12.34)

(19)
59.00 (13.00)
54.95 (12.44)
53.79 (9.89)
57.95 (9.64)
54.58 (10.07)
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Table 7.2: ADHD & Related Outcomes (Conners 3—SR), Descriptives by Age & Biological Sex
Biological Sex
Females
Males
Younger
Older
Younger
Older
Mean (SD)
(11)
(13)
(19)
(8)
INT
HYP
DEF
LP
FAM

62.92 (15.08)
59.31 (8.53)
55.62 (15.17)
60.38 (12.39)
56.00 (15.62)

57.09 (15.17)
51.00 (11.63)
53.36 (8.59)
57.54 (10.84)
51.82 (6.66)

63.16 (12.66)
65.53 (10.64)
57.26 (13.30)
58.37 (9.39)
52.79 (9.54)

61.63 (9.59)
60.38 (12.17)
54.38 (12.06)
58.38 (8.40)
58.38 (12.99)

Inattentiveness (INT). Results from the Inattentiveness (INT) subscale reflect the range of
symptoms and behaviors associated with concentration, focus and attention difficulty (or lack
thereof). INT T-scores scores across the current sample (N = 51) (M = 61.55, SD = 13.03) fall
within the High Average range. Results from an independent samples t-test indicated no significant
differences in INT T-scores between females (n = 24) (M = 60.25, SD = 15.08) and males (n = 27)
(M = 62.70, SD = 11.67) (t(49) = .65, p = .52) or between younger (n = 32) (ages 8-12) (M =
63.06, SD = 13.46) and older youth (n = 19) (ages 13-17) (M = 59.00, SD = 13.00) (t(49) = 1.06,
p = .30); further, age (β = -.05, SE = .80) was not a significant predictor of INT T-scores (F(1, 49)
= .11, p = .75, R2 = .002). No further follow-up analyses were indicated.
Learning Problems (LP). The Learning Problems / Executive Functioning (LP) subscale
reflects the range of difficulties associated with academic subjects including arithmetic, writing,
reading, and general acquisition of new knowledge. LP T-scores scores across the current sample
(N = 51) (M = 58.73, SD = 10.15) corresponded to the Average range; further, results from an
independent samples t-test indicated no significant differences in LP T-scores between females (n
= 24) (M = 59.13, SD = 11.54) and males (n = 27) (M = 60.00, SD = 9.95) (F(1, 49) = .07, p = .74),
or between younger (ages 8-12) (M = 59.19, SD = 10.57) and older youth (ages 13-17) (M = 57.95,
SD = 9.64) (t(49) = .42, p = .68). Finally, linear regression results indicated that youth’s age (β =
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.005, SE = .61, t(48) = .03) was not a significant predictor of LP T-scores (F(1, 49) = .001, p = .97,
R2 = .000); no follow-up analyses were conducted as a result.
Family Relationships (FAM). The Family Relationships (FAM) subscale represents the range
of factors that characterize a youth’s experience within their family, including: interpersonal
interactions, feeling loved/wanted/respected, or alternatively, unjustly criticized or punished at
home. FAM T-scores across the current sample (N = 51) (M = 54.27, SD = 11.38) corresponded
to the Average range. Results from an independent samples t-test indicated no significant
differences in FAM T-scores between females (M = 54.08, SD = 12.29) and males (M = 54.44, SD
= 10.73) (F(1, 49) = .01, p = .91). Similarly, no significant differences in FAM T-scores emerged
between younger (ages 8-12) (M = 54.09, SD = 12.34) and older youth (ages 13-17) (M = 54.58
SD = 10.07) (t(49) = -.15, p = .89). Further, age was not a significant predictor of FAM T-scores
(β = -.04, SE = .68, t(48) = -.30) (F(1, 49) = .09, p = .77, R2 = .002). No further or follow-up
analyses were conducted as a result.
Defiance / Aggression (DEF). Results from the Defiance / Aggression (DEF) subscale reflect
physical and/or verbal aggressiveness or a tendency to show violent and/or destructive behaviors,
including: bullying, argumentativeness, cruelty and anger control. DEF T-scores across the current
sample (N = 51) (M = 55.55, SD = 12.51) corresponded to the Average range. Results from an
independent samples t-test indicated no significant differences in DEF T-scores between females
(M = 54.58, SD = 12.39) and males (M = 56.41, SD = 12.78) (F(1, 49) = .27, p = .61) or between
younger (ages 8-12) (M = 56.59, SD = 13.88) and older youth (ages 13-17) (M = 53.79, SD = 9.89)
(t(49) = .77, p = .44). Finally, results from a linear regression indicated that age (β = -.02, SE =
.75, t(49) = -.15) was not a significant predictor of DEF T-scores (F(1, 49) = .02, p = .88, R2 =
.000). No further or follow-up analyses were conducted as a result.
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Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP). Results from the Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP)
subscale reflect the range of symptoms and behaviors association with high-level energy /
impulsive behaviors and difficulty with delayed gratification or operating patiently. Overall, and
consistent with age-related predictions, HYP T-scores inversely correlated with age (r(49) = -.39,
p < .01), and further, were significantly higher among younger (ages 8-12) (M = 63.00 SD = 10.17)
versus older youth (ages 13-17) (M = 54.95, SD = 12.44) (t(49) = 2.51, p < .05). Further, HYP Tscores were significantly higher among males (M = 64.00, SD = 11.13) versus females (M = 55.50,
SD = 10.69) (F(1, 49) = 7.69, p < .05).
Results from a follow-up 2x2 ANOVA revealed significant differences in HYP T-scores based
on youth’s biological sex and age group (F(3, 47) = 4.38, p < .01), such that younger males reported
significantly higher HYP T-scores (M = 65.53, SD = 10.64) compared to older females (M = 51.00,
SD = 11.58), although no other significant differences were indicated. A multiple linear regression
was used to expand on these results, revealing significant main effects for both age (β = -.32, SE
= .21, t(48) = -.25, p < .05) and biological sex (β = -.30, SE = .23, t(48) = -2.29, p < .05) in
predicting HYP T-scores (F(2, 48) = 7.25, p < .05). Combined, results indicated that males
regardless of age, reported higher Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP) T-scores compared to
females, who further, endorsed fewer symptoms as they aged (i.e., older versus younger female
group).
ADHD & Related Outcomes Summary. Combined, results from the current study highlight
several significant relationships between ADHD and related outcomes among a clinical sample of
children and adolescents. Overall, results revealed symptoms of Inattentiveness (INT) and
Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP) in the High Average range, however, all other outcomes were
within the Average range, including: Learning Problems (LP), Defiance/Aggression (DEF) and
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Family Problems (FAM). Multiple between-group differences and symptom patterns/trends were
also indicated according to youth’s age and biological sex. Specifically, regarding Hyperactivity /
Impulsivity (HYP) T-scores, results from a multiple regression indicated main effects for
biological sex and age, such that HYP T-scores were comparable across younger females and
males, however, older females (ages 13-17) endorsed significantly fewer HYP symptoms
compared to the other three groups.
Intersections & Interactions: Psychiatric Symptoms and Unconscious Constructs
As outlined below, several significant relationships between measures of unconscious
processes and youth’s self-reported psychiatric symptoms were identified within the current
sample. Follow-up analyses were conducted to clarify and expand on underlying relationships as
indicated. Youth’s self-report depression symptom scores will be outlined first, followed by
ADHD and related outcomes to highlight underlying relationships between measures of
unconscious processes, affective and behavioral dysregulation and psychiatric symptomology.
Depression (DEP) x AMS, DMs, OR. Follow-up analyses were conducted based on outcomes
from youth’s self-report Depression (DEP) T-scores outlined in the section above, and as related
to results from projective tests / measures of unconscious processes, including: Affect Maturity
(AMS-M), Object Relations (OR, MOA-M) and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs); results are
outlined in Table 8.1 below.
First, regarding DEP T-scores and Object Relations (OR), results from the entire sample (N =
48) reveal a significant, inverse correlation between average Object Relations scores (MOA-M)
and DEP T-scores, (r(46) = .30, p < .05), even when controlling for age and sex (r(39) = .30, p <
.05). Further, results from a linear regression indicated higher (worse) MOA-M predicted higher
DEP T-scores (β = .30, SE = 1.06, t(43) = 2.07), and overall, accounted for 8.9% of variance in
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youth’s Total Depression scores (F(1, 47) = 4.27, p < .05, R2 = .09). A stepwise linear regression
was further conducted to follow-up; results revealed that youth’s age (β = .43, SE = .51, t(44)
= 3.29) was the strongest predictor of DEP T-scores, but combined with MOA-M scores (β =
.33, SE = .96 , t(44) = 2.53) accounted for approximately 27% of variance in Total Depression
(DEP) scores (F(2,43) = 8.04, p < .001, R2 = .27); results further indicated no significant
interaction effect, and as a result, no further analyses were used to follow-up.
Next, outcomes across the entire sample (N = 48) indicated no significant relationship between
Depression (DEP) T-scores and Affect Maturity (AMS-M) (r(46) = .12, p = .42), according to
biological sex (females: r(20) = .01, p = .98; males: r(24) = .26, p = .21), or across age groups
(Younger: r(30) = -.22, p = .22; Older: r(30) = .21, p = .40); no further analyses were conducted
as a result.6 Finally, DEP T-scores among the entire sample (N = 48) did not significantly correlate
with use of any Defense Mechanisms (DMs), including: Denial (DEN) (r(46) = .16, p = .28),
Projection (PRO) (r(46) = -.18, p = .23) and Identification (IDEN) (r(46) = -.03, p = .86), according
to biological sex or across age groups.
Table 8.1: Total Depression (DEP) T-scores, Correlations: MOA-M, AMS & OR
Biological Sex
Females
Males
All
Females
Males
Younger
Older
Younger
Older
N=
51
(24)
(27)
(11)
(13)
(19)
(8)
(27)
.117
-.383
.099
.147
.291
AMS-M
.006
.297*
.256
MOA-M
.267
.159
.483
.276
.365
.159
.298
DEN
.238
.642*
-.080
.060
.318
-.178
.109
PROJ
-.135
-.023
.077
-.182
-.556
-.025
-.222
IDEN
-.122
-.523
.017
.127
-.068
* p < .05 / ** p < .01

6

Although not reportable by significance standards, (due to non-significant between-group differences), as shown in
Table 8.1, outcomes also indicated a strong positive correlation between use of DEN and DEP T-scores among
younger females (ages 8 – 12); however, results will be revisited in the Discussion section below.
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Depression Summary. Overall, results from the current sample indicated no significant
relationships between youth’s depression symptoms (DEP T-scores), Affect Maturity (AMS) and
use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs). However, even after controlling for age and biological sex,
higher MOA-M scores—indicating worse Object Relations (OR)—predicted higher rates of selfreport depression among youth, and further, account for a significant portion of variance in Total
Depression (DEP) scores. Further, when combined with age as a predictor, higher MOA-M scores
predicted a significant portion of total variance in DEP T-scores. Taken together, results indicated
that poor Object Relations and use of immature Defense Mechanisms (DMs) may significantly
contribute to higher Depression T-scores among youth, above and beyond age-expected rates of
change, and among adolescent females in particular.
ADHD & Related Outcomes x AMS, MOA & DMs. Next, follow-up analyses were
conducted to explore relationships between youth’s self-report ADHD and related symptoms Tscores (Conners 3—SR), including: Inattentiveness (INT), Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP),
Learning Problems (LP), Defiance / Aggression (DEF), and Family Relationships (FAM), as
related to Affect Maturity (AMS-M), Object Relations (MOA-M) and use of Defense Mechanisms
(DMs). Among the entire sample (N = 48), and as outlined in Table 9.1 below, Inattentiveness
(INT) scores were not significantly correlated to any unconscious constructs, including: MOA-M
(r(46) = .10, p = .51), AMS-M r(46) = -.11, p = .45 and DMs (DEN: r(46) = .08, p = .59, PRO:
r(46) = -.06, p = .68, and IDEN: r(46) = -.03, p = .83). Results were similarly non-significant for
Learning Problems (LP) scores, including: MOA-M (r(46) = -.08, p = .61), AMS-M (r(46) = .03,
p = .82), and DMs (DEN: r(46) = .11, p = .45; PRO: r(46) = -.14, p = .36; and IDEN: r(46) = .003, p = .99). Next, no significant correlations emerged among the entire sample between Family
Relationships (FAM) T-scores and all unconscious constructs, including: MOA-M (r(46) = .28, p
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= .06), AMS-M (r(46) = -.15, p = .29), and DMs (DEN: r(46) = .06, p = .69; PRO: r(46) = .03, p
= .85; and IDEN: r(46) = -.10, p = .50). No further analyses were conducted regarding INT, LP
and FAM T-scores due to non-significant results described above. However, significant
correlations were identified between Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP) and Defiance / Aggression
(DEF) T-scores and are outlined independently below.
Table 9.1: Projective Outcomes x Self-Report T-Scores, Correlations
Defense Mechanisms (DMs)
N = 48
MOA-M
AMS-M
DEN
PRO
IDEN
INT
.099
LP
-.078
FAM
.275
HYP
.305*
DEF
.063
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001

-.110
.033
-.153
-.348*
-.308*

.081
.112
.060
.213
.311*

-.061
-.135
.028
.026
-.116

-.032
-.003
-.100
-.291*
-.275

Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP). As noted, and outlined in Table 9.1 above, multiple
significant correlations emerged between Hyperactivity / Impulsivity T-scores and measures of
unconscious outcomes. First, Affect Maturity (AMS-M) scores inversely correlated with HYP Tscores across the entire sample (N = 46) (r(45) = -.35, p < .01). A follow-up linear regression
revealed lower Affect Maturity significantly predicted higher Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (β =
-.35, SE = .2.33, t(44) = -2.57), accounting for 11.7% of variance in total HYP T-scores (F(1,
46) = 6.62, p < .01, R2 = .12). AMS-M and HYP T-scores, however, were no longer significantly
correlated after controlling for age (r(45) = -.18, p < .05); no further analyses were used to followup accordingly.
Next, regarding use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs), results from the entire sample (N = 46)
indicated no significant relationships between Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP) T-scores and
DEN (r(45) = .21, p = .15) and PRO (r(45) = .03, p = .86), but revealed a significant inverse
correlation between HYP T-scores and Identification (IDEN) (r(45) = -.29, p < .05); however,
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results were no longer significant after controlling for age (r(45) = -.22, p = .14); no further
analyses were used to follow-up accordingly.
However, as outlined in Table 9.2 below, regarding HYP T-scores and Object Relations (OR,
MOA-M), results across the entire sample (N = 48) revealed a significant positive correlation
between MOA-M and HYP T-scores (r(46) = .31, p < .05), even when controlling for age (r(40) =
.33, p < .05). As a result, a follow-up multiple linear regression was used to predict HYP T-scores
based on youth’s Object Relations scores (MOA-M) and age; results indicated main effects for age
(younger) (β = -.35, SE = .69, t(48) = -2.58 , p < .01) and MOA-M scores (higher, worse OR)
(β = .28, SE = 1.29, t(46) = 2.05, p < .05) in predicting higher HYP T-scores (F(2, 43) = 5.87,
p < .05, R2 = .21). Further, outcomes from a test of interaction effects were non-significant (F(1,
42) = .42, p = .52), indicating that age and Object Relations (OR, MOA-M) scores each made
unique contributions to total variance in HYP T-scores.
Table 9.2: Age & MOA-M scores predict HYP T-scores, Multiple Linear Regression

(Constant)
Age
MOA-M
(Interaction)

R2

F

(df)

β

SE

t

p-value

.215

5.874

(4, 43)

71.549

9.287

7.704

.000

-.350
.278

.686
1.287

.418

(1, 46)
(1,46)
(1, 42)

-2.579
2.052
.421

.013
.046
.522

Defiance / Aggression (DEF). Regarding Defiance / Aggression (DEF) symptoms and
unconscious constructs, outcomes from the entire sample (N = 48) indicated no significant
relationships between DEF T-scores and Object Relations (OR, MOA-M) (r(46) = .06, p = .68).
However, results from the entire sample revealed a significant, inverse correlation between DEF
T-scores and Affect Maturity (AMS-M) (r(50) = -.31, p < .05). Outcomes from a follow-up linear
regression indicated a main effect for AMS-M scores (lower) (β = -.31, SE = 2.47) as a significant
predictor of higher DEF T-scores, which accounted for 9.8% of variance in total Defiance /
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Aggression symptoms (F(1, 48) = 5.02, p < .05, R2 = .10). However, results were non-significant
when rerun controlling for age (r(40) = .26, p = .10); no further analyses were used as a result.
In addition to age, results indicated between group differences based on biological sex. Among
males, DEF T-scores were significantly and inversely correlated with AMS-M scores (r(24) =
-.496, p < .01), however, DEF T-score did not correlate with MOA-M scores (r(24) = -.217, p =
.33) or use of any DMs, including: DEN (r(24) = .295, p = .14), PRO (r(24) = -.158, p = .44), or
IDEN (r(24) = -.276, p = .17). Whereas among females, DEF T-scores did not significantly
correlate with any unconscious constructs, including: AMS-M (r(20) = -.093, p = .67), MOA-M
(r(20) = .313, p = .14), or DMs (DEN: (r(20) = .322, p = .14; PRO: (r(20) = -.069, p = .76; IDEN:
(r(20) = -.263, p = .24).
Finally, regarding use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs), outcomes revealed a positive
correlation between DEF T-scores and use of Denial (DEN) (r(48) = .31, p < .05) (although not
after controlling for age, (r(40) = .27, p = .08)), and no significant correlations were found with
use of Projection (PRO) (r(48) = -.06, p = .57) nor Identification (IDEN) (r(48) = -.03, p = .07).
Results from a follow-up linear regression revealed a significant main effect for DEN (higher (β
= .31, SE = 10.04, t(45)= 2.22) in predicting higher DEF T-scores (F(1, 46) = 4.91, p < .05,
R2 = .10). No further analyses were used based on outcomes described above.
As presented in Figure 9.2 below, a linear regression was used to follow-up on significant
results described above; outcomes indicated that when combined, AMS-M (β = -2.74, SE =
2.72, t(49) = -.91) and DEN (β = 17.93, SE = 11.13, t(49) = 1.61) were no longer
significant predictors of DEF T-scores (F(1, 46) = 2.86, p = .07, R2 = .11). As a result, analyses
were rerun with SPSS PROCESS 3.4 to identify interactions and/or underlying relationships
between each predictor as related to DEF T-scores. Results revealed a significant mediation model
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overall (F(1, 44) = 4.91, p < .05), such that the relationship between youth’s use of Denial (DEN)
and self-report Defiance / Aggression (DEF) T-scores was accounted for by changes in Affect
Maturity scores (AMS-M) (t(49) = 2.22, p < .05). Further, no significant interaction emerged
between AMS and DEN scores (F(1, 44), = 1.14, p = .29), indicating they each made unique
contributions in predicting overall DEF T-scores.

Figure 9.2: Denial (DM) & Affect Maturity (AMS-M) predict Defiance / Aggression (DEF) T-scores

**

8*
-.42

AMS

-.24
8*

.311*

DEN

DEF

ADHD & Related Outcomes Interaction Summary. Overall, outcomes indicated few
significant relationships between unconscious processes and self-report measures as indicated by
non-significant correlations with ADHD and related symptoms, including: Inattentiveness (INT),
Learning Problems (LP) and Family Relationships (FR). Next, outcomes revealed higher rates of
Hyperactivity / Impulsivity (HYP) among younger youth, even when controlling for age, and even
further among those with lower Affect Maturity. However, results indicated that combined with
increased age, higher MOA-M scores (reflecting worse Object Relations) were the only significant
predictor of HYP T-scores after controlling for age. The following discussion section below will
further expand on results outlined above and review outcomes as related to hypotheses and
predictions guiding the current study.
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Discussion
In light of recent and emerging trends in psychological practice and research, intake
evaluations and assessments for clinical services increasingly rely on self-report measures to
investigate affective, behavioral and cognitive indicators of psychiatric symptoms or impaired
functioning, particularly among populations of children and adolescents (Achenbach, 1985). In
addition to the ease of administration and simplicity of scoring, self-report measures are validated
and standardized using large normed samples, and increasingly, include supplemental versions for
meaningful cross-informant comparisons (e.g., caregivers and teachers) (Figuras et al., 2010).
Further, internalized, externalized and combined types of psychiatric symptoms or presentations
have been associated with broad, underlying deficits in emotion regulation—including a wide
range of intrapsychic processes contributing to affective modulation and behavioral control in the
service of sustained individual or interpersonal functioning. Yet few contemporary instruments,
by way of self-report or clinical interview, systematically operationalize and measure automatic
and implicit emotion regulation processes, or in other words, those which occur unconsciously.
However, empirical research grounded in psychodynamic and psychoanalytic theory suggests
that processes outside the realm of conscious awareness have significant implications for emotion
regulation processes. Further, theorists and researchers suggest that emotion regulation processes
begin during the earliest stages of life and constitute not only one of the most significant
achievements, but an on-going process that influences development and overall functioning
throughout the life course (Cramer, 2001). Empirical studies indicate that deficits or delays in
intrapsychic development (e.g., psychological processes), including those which impact one’s
awareness, perception and experience of external stimuli, have significant implications for the
(in)ability to modulate when exposed to stressful situations / events.
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Unlike self-reports and instruments based on one’s conscious awareness, projective tests can
be used to operationalize, measure and interpret unconscious processes with theoretical and
empirical relationships to psychiatric symptomology and underlying emotion regulation processes.
Further, when used alongside outcomes from standardized, self-report measures of psychiatric
symptoms, outcomes from projective instruments provide rich, invaluable information regarding
emotional maturation and (under-)development. As a result, the current study intends to explore
underlying relationships, interactions and intersections across unconscious, intrapsychic processes
as they contribute to affective, behavioral manifestations of emotional dysregulation (i.e.,
symptom severity).
Outcomes from the current study were obtained from a sample of urban youth (N = 51, 53%
male) ages 8—17 (M = 11.27, SD = 2.38) seeking psychological services through a community
based-mental health clinic in Harlem, New York between September 2016—2019. Results from
the Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM) and Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) were used to
examine three psychodynamic phenomena, including: Object Relatedness (OR), Affect Maturity
(AMS) and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs). Psychiatric symptoms were assessed using
standardized self-report instruments, capturing a broad range of internalized and externalized
presentations (e.g. depression, ADHD and related outcomes).
The following discussion includes an overview of results from the current study, highlighting
several significant relationships identified between unconscious processes and self-reported
psychiatric symptoms, which are theorized to have broader implications for systems underlying
automatic emotion regulation, maturation and development. First, results from youth’s projective
tests, including use of DMs, OR and AMS, will be described and discussed within the broader
context of psychodynamic and psychoanalytic theories regarding unconscious processes,
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emotional development and functioning. Next, results from youth’s self-report measures of
psychiatric symptoms—including depression, ADHD and related outcomes—will be discussed
independently, as they interact and coincide among the sample of current youth. Finally,
underlying relationships between unconscious processes and psychiatric symptoms will be further
discussed as related to statistically significant results from the current study. Finally, expected and
unexpected findings—including independent outcomes and interactions between variables—will
be discussed as related to historical precedent, contemporary theory and future directions.
Unconscious Constructs: Object Relations (OR), Affect Maturity (AM) & Defense
Mechanisms (DMs)
Object Relations (OR, MOA-M). As development begins and progresses, formative object
relational ties shape the landscape for individual and interpersonal events, influencing one’s
understanding of past experiences and framing future expectations. Klein (1946) and later theorists
further proposed that healthy internal objects and object relationships are fundamental to the
process of experiencing and regulating emotions independently, and as mediated by others. For
example, drawing on a ‘good object’ when in duress promotes the infant’s independence and
capacity to self-soothe (Sandler & Sandler, 1986). Relatedly, ‘splitting off’ of the ‘bad object’
affords a psychological sanctuary from hostile and destructive feelings, to safely take in what is
needed. Klein (1946) expanded further, asserting that the infant’s intrapsychic ‘splitting off’ of the
object also emerges as part of a developing sense of self, wherein the infant who experiences
frustration and aggressive urges towards the object remains entirely distinct from the infant who
is fed, satisfied and loving of the object. Further, as Winnicott suggested (1950) the ‘good object’
can be ‘destroyed’ by the infant’s aggressive or destructive impulses within the realm of phantasy,
preserving the intrapsychic relationship (object) apart from the literalness of the physical world.
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Based on theoretical and empirical precedents, no specific differences in Object Relations were
expected (predicted) or found according to youth’s age and/or biological sex across the current
sample of children and adolescents in the study. Results from the Rorschach Inkblot Method (RIM)
were used to derive average Object Relations (OR) scores based on Urist’s Mutuality of Autonomy
(MOA) scale (Urist, 1977). Overall, results from the current study indicated that average Object
Relations (MOA-M) scores among youth fell between the MOA3 - MOA4 range. Results further
indicated that MOA4 was the modal (most common) score across groups of youth.
According to Urist (1977), scores within the MOA3—Simple Interaction—range represent
interdependent relationships, wherein one character’s sense of self is constructed and sustained by
use of (or overreliance on) another. MOA4—Anaclitic-Dependent—scores, considered
unhealthier still, are characterized by a loss of autonomy, wherein characters are seen as a
reflection, imprint or extension of the other. Unlike MOA3, MOA4 scores fail to differentiate
psychological states between characters, such that they manifest one ‘collective’ affective
response. Further, nearly one in three youth from the current sample provided RIM responses
scored as an MOA5, MOA6 or MOA7 scale point. Finally, results across the sample indicated that
males had a wider and lower overall MOA score range [MOA1-MOA7] compared to females
[MOA1-MOA5]; in other words, an MOA7 score was indicated among males in the sample,
however the lowest MOA score found among females was in the MOA5 range. These results too
lend support for underlying relationships between unhealthy object relationships and externalized
behaviors (e.g., defiance and aggression).
Overall, results from the current study support empirical precedents indicating that Object
Relatedness may be qualitatively or developmentally distinct apart from other unconscious
phenomenon involved in emotion regulation. Specifically, outcomes from the current sample
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revealed no significant change in Object Relations scores across age groups (i.e., younger versus
older), nor did average MOA scores improve with age overall, suggesting that OR does not
inherently change or grow “healthier” as part of the developmental (aging) process. Rather,
outcomes indicated similar MOA-M scores regardless of age (except for healthier modal scores
among younger males, as noted above). Further outcomes, including relationships to other
unconscious constructs (e.g., AMS, DMs) and psychiatric symptoms (e.g., depression, ADHD and
Related Outcomes) will be discussed further below. Cumulatively, these findings may also provide
further support for meta-analysis outcomes from Mihura, Meyer, Dumitrascu & Bombel (2013),
who proposed the MOA scale to measure psychopathology, rather than its more traditional use for
measuring object relational development or change over time.
Affect Maturity (AMS, AMS-M). Affect Maturity (AM) is an intrapsychic phenomenon
characterized by the developmentally driven and evolving nature of affective experiences across
several emotion regulatory domains (Thompson, 1981). Using outcomes from the Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT), results from the Affect Maturity Scale (AMS; Thompson, 1981) were
based on a five-point continuum of affect maturation and development, capturing both
intentionality and cognitive organization. In addition to differentiation of self-, other,
environmental, and other temporal realities, increased Affect Maturity promotes one’s sense of
agency—or internal locus of control—regarding emotions. Thompson (1981) further proposed
that with time, maturation creates room for emotions (particularly negative emotions) to be not
only acknowledged, but also attributed to oneself and/or others, supporting further expression,
resolution and growth.
Overall, average Affect Maturity scores (AMS-M) significantly increased with age across the
entire sample. However, consistent with theoretical and empirical precedent (e.g., Gray, 2018),
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results from follow-up analyses indicated distinct patterns in AMS-M scores according to
biological sex and age group (e.g., younger versus older). Specifically, AMS-M scores were
significantly higher among females compared to males, regardless of age. Importantly, however,
no significant increase in AMS-M scores emerged across groups of females (e.g., younger versus
older), whereas older males (ages 13-17) had significantly higher AMS-M scores compared to
younger males (ages 8-12). Broadly, outcomes from the current sample suggest differential
trajectories or rates of Affect Maturity according to biological sex and chronological age. Among
females, for example, although Affect Maturity may develop earlier on, results across age groups
suggest that AMS may also arrest, plateau, and/or regress during the transition from
preadolescence through adolescence. Among males in the sample, however, Affect Maturity
appears to develop later on, although it continues to evolve and significantly mature with age, such
that by adolescence, males’ Affect Maturity rates are comparable to their same-age female peers.
Combined, results lend further support for conceptualizing unconscious systems of emotion
regulation at the intersection of developmental and sociobiological factors, including conscious
and unconscious phenomena. Overall, however, outcomes across the entire sample reflect
significant underdevelopments in Affect Maturity, according to Thompson’s (1981) Affect
Maturity Scale (AMS) scoring system. Broadly, AMS-M scores across youth (N = 50) mostly fell
between scale point Levels I – III and on average, in the Level II range (M = 2.28, SD = .68), with
the only significant difference indicated between the highest (adolescent females) and lowest
(preadolescent males) scoring groups.
According to Thompson (1981), AMS Level I reflects the period between ages 0 – 2, when
affect is easily aroused and takes on a ‘globalized’ quality, as evident in “event-like” experience
of emotions, most often due to physiological state changes or reactions to perceived stress, threat
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or risk. Moreover, a lack of self-other differentiation and temporal sensibility brings on the feeling
that one is ‘subsumed’ or ‘embedded’ within an emotional state, which transcends conventions of
time and space. As a result, single moments and interactions exist as isolated “events,” each of
which represents the only one that is and ever will be. Consequently, the onset of psychological or
physiological discomfort or distress is accompanied by a flood of affective overwhelm and
dysregulation, which is insufficiently tolerated or resolved without supportive intervention or
coping responses. As a result, when operating in AMS Level I, affect (events) which cannot be
tolerated or even acknowledged, including contradictory, unpleasant or traumatic events, can only
be dealt with by ‘shutting out’, ‘warding off’ or ‘ignoring’ when unwanted.
Thompson (1981) described the shift towards AM Level II (ages 2 – 6) as accompanied by
rudimentary differentiation between self and other. However, according to the author (Thompson,
1981), mental states remain mostly undifferentiated, such that one does not ‘become’ an emotional
state, but may experience themself as ‘lodged within’ an emotional state. Finally, Thompson
described several significant shifts as part of the transition into AM Level III (ages 6 – 11) which
signify important developmental milestones. Namely, in AM Level III, emotions are attributed to
individual persons (semi-independently), are increasingly reversible, and are internalized states
which emerge in response to external events or stimuli, rather than solely from within. Relatedly,
multiple affective states may emerge simultaneously (although remain segregated) in AM Level
III, which coincides with agency and control over emotional expressions and a sense that emotions
must be “dealt with” rather than simply rejected, substituted or ignored.
Overall, results across youth in the current sample reflect underdeveloped rates of Affect
Maturity, such that the onset of distress or exposure to emotionally activating stimuli is
synonymous with inundation, overwhelm and the onslaught of ‘intrapsychic flooding.’ Further,
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regardless of age or biological sex, most youth in the sample fell at least one level (if not two or
more) below expectations given their chronological age. For example, Thompson (1981) states
that Affect Maturity Level IV should predominate by adolescence, marked by increased awareness
of emotional reversibility, recognition of and accountability for the interpersonal nature of
emotions, and further, coincides with the onset of new affective experiences, including regret,
remorse and guilt. However, as indicated, adolescent youth in the current sample most often fell
within the Level II range, such that they are more likely to feel ‘lodged within’ an affective state
rather than experiencing them as reversible, temporal or as the result of external events.
Although the directionality of relationships remains unclear, outcomes from the current study
converge with empirical studies highlighting psychological shifts which emerge and allow for
integration of the experience of the “other” into the “self.” Over the course of development, this
integration contributes to and coincides with experiencing affect as an “internal” rather than
“external” event and which increasingly, exists within one’s control. Put differently, developing
mastery over one’s emotional life in part, relies on the ability to become aware of and sustain
contact with one’s affective states. Further, effective management of one’s impulses engenders
agency over one’s emotional states as well as awareness of other’s subjectivity, which in turn,
builds self-esteem and strengthens interpersonal relationships. Overall, outcomes from the current
study suggest that AMS scores may be utilized to capture the ways in which youth typically (e.g.,
average AMS) and broadly (e.g., AMS score range) react to, process and regulate their own
emotional experiences.
Defense Mechanisms (DMs): DEN, PRO, IDEN. Related to Thompson’s (1981)
conceptualization of Affect Maturity, the onset and trajectory of defense mechanisms have also
been theoretically and empirically linked to early and on-going emotion regulation processes.
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Namely, automatic, unconscious defenses emerge and take prominence according to unique
developmental onsets and trajectories. Cramer (2001) developed the Defense Mechanism Manual
(DMM) to meaningfully organize and systematically measure developmental features of defense
mechanisms. Specifically, Cramer (2001) operationalized three prominent defenses from most to
least primitive based on outcomes from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), including: Denial
(DEN), Projection (PRO) and Identification (IDEN).
As the first and most primitive defense to emerge, Denial (DEN) (most prominent between
ages 2 – 6), relies on simple cognitive processes which serve early adaptive functions. Specifically,
the onset of distress or exposure to stressful stimuli is dealt with by ‘warding off’ or ignoring,
which may be protective and even necessary under extreme states of duress. However, Denial is
neither adaptive nor amenable to change, and as a result, interferes with intrapsychic and
interpersonal development and growth. Consequently, use of DEN is predicted to decline with age,
and among other studies with non-clinical samples, has been shown to significantly decrease after
age six and give way to new, increasingly complex defenses (e.g., Projection or Identification)
(Cramer, 1987; 1997; 2007). Importantly however, use of primitive defense mechanisms,
particularly when outdated or overly relied upon (e.g., automatically or inflexibly applied), results
in maladaptive affective and / or behavioral responses to activating stimuli. Overall, outcomes
from the current study highlight several unique parallels and distinctions from previous research
regarding use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs) among children and adolescents. Namely, results
across the entire sample indicated that age was not a significant predictor of mature defense use.
In other words, regardless of age, children and adolescents in the current sample (between ages 8
– 17) were equally likely to rely on the most primitive defense mechanism, Denial (DEN), when
reacting to emotionally activating stimuli.
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Further, according to Cramer (1999; 2001), Identification (IDEN) should emerge as the
prominent defense mechanism during adolescence, although it will continue to coexist alongside
others, including less mature defenses (e.g., Denial and Projection). Interestingly, although not
predicted as part of the current study, outcomes revealed significantly higher rates of Identification
(IDEN) among females, as compared to males in the sample.
In addition to the clinical nature of the current sample, previous studies with similar
populations may shed light on unexpected outcomes from the current study. Namely, Cramer &
Tracy (2005) theorized that persistent or excessive use of primitive defenses may reflect an
“overreliance” on reality-distorting processes to cope with environmental or circumstantial
stressors (e.g., low SES), from an early age. Whereas others suggested that shifts in or immature
defense use may represent a “regression” from a previously attained level of functioning. Although
not directly assessed or measured as part of the current study, outcomes from the sample of
children and adolescents suggest that to varied degrees of severity (i.e., by age), most of the youth
presenting for clinical services do so with predominantly immature and underdeveloped defense
mechanisms compared to their developmental age / stage. More specifically, when confronted with
stressful or overwhelming stimuli, youth in the current sample tend to “shut down”, “shut out”, or
“ward off” stressors, which is developmentally, least adaptive, functional or sustainable.
Interestingly, while no differences emerged in use of Denial (DEN) or Projection (PRO) according
to age or biological sex, outcomes from the current sample revealed significantly higher rates of
Identification (IDEN) among females across the entire sample.
AMS, MOA-M and DMs Intersections & Interactions. Overall, results across the entire
sample indicated significant and non-significant relationships across measures of unconscious
processes, including: Object Relations scores (MOA-M), Affect Maturity scores (AMS) and use
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of Defense Mechanisms (DMs: DEN, PRO and IDEN). Further, outcomes from several follow-up
analyses revealed between-group differences, which shed further light on underlying relationships
between youth’s unconscious, internal systems for emotional regulation. While these underlying
relationships contribute to the overarching goals of the current study, no explicit predictions or
tested hypotheses were based on their intersections. Results however, did reveal significant
relationships between unconscious constructs involved in emotion regulation processes as outlined
below.
First, regarding Object Relations (OR), results across the entire sample of youth revealed no
significant relationships between average MOA (MOA-M) and Affect Maturity (AM) scores.
Further, MOA-M scores were not significantly associated with proportionate use of defense
mechanisms, including: Denial (DEN), Projection (PRO) and Identification (IDEN). Combined,
these outcomes converge with theory and empirical research which suggests that Object Relational
phenomenon may develop and operate distinctly apart from other developmentally-driven
unconscious processes. While not initially predicted or statistically significant in the current
sample of youth, outcomes from the current study may complicate Cramer’s assertion regarding
the development of defense mechanisms and internalized Object Relations. According to Cramer
(1988), “denial appears to go hand in hand with the absence of disturbed object relations” (p. 62),
by warding off threats to the ‘good’ internalized object, which is in turn, synonymous to the self.
In contrast, outcomes from the current study indicated greater use of DEN among those with worse
(unhealthier) Object Relations scores (MOA-M). Importantly, Cramer’s (1988; 1999; 2001)
theoretical and empirical research studies were largely based on non-clinical, mostly Caucasian,
middle-class samples of children and adolescents. As noted in the Results section outlined above,
results from the current study are based on a racially and ethnically diverse sample of individuals
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presenting for clinical services at a community-based mental health clinic, reflecting distinct and
non-interchangeable groups of youth.
Next, regarding Affect Maturity (AM) and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs), results from
the current study offered further evidence for their shared developmental trajectories and
intersecting relationships (i.e., Gray, 2018). Namely, outcomes across the entire sample indicated
that less Denial (DEN), but to a greater extent, more Identification (IDEN), each predicted higher
Affect Maturity scores. However, follow-up analyses revealed this was true for males only—who
also notably, were shown to have significantly lower AMS scores compared to females, until
adolescence. In contrast, higher AMS-M scores were only associated with increased use of IDEN
across females (but not a decline in DEN). Combined, these results reflect Thompson’s (1981;
1986) distinctions between AMS Levels II and III, such that emotions shift from sojourned inside
the self and uncontrollable unless expelled, to increasingly explicit, specific, acknowledgeable
reactions to individuals or events outside the self. Unlike less mature defenses, use of IDEN
reflects achievement of advanced cognitive abilities and healthy shifts away from ‘splitting’ and
towards healthy, integrated, self-other relationships, wherein mixed, ambivalent and/or negative
affect can be recognized, tolerated and worked through. Further, and consistent with Thompson’s
(1981) theory of AM development, IDEN requires differentiation between self and other, and
multiple others, which in turn, builds healthy enduring internal representations (Cramer, 1998).
Importantly, however, outcomes from the current sample indicate that Affect Maturity and use of
Defense Mechanisms (DMs) are not interchangeable, but rather, reflect distinct, intrapsychic
phenomenon and measurable constructs.
Combined, results across measures of unconscious processes, including AM, DMs and OR,
offer further support for the two-fold importance of both developmental shifts and advancing
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systems of emotional regulation, which in turn promote emotional awareness, tolerance for distress
and adaptive strategies to cope and garner social support when in distress. Further, differential
rates of growth and change in AMS-M scores between males and females identified in the current
sample suggest other biopsychosocial factors may be involved in, and contribute to, incremental
changes in Affect Maturity as related to demographic differences (e.g., socialization and sexspecific norms for females versus males). Based on the predicted relationships and hypotheses of
the current study, the following sections discuss interactions and underlying relationships between
unconscious processes and psychiatric symptomology.
Psychiatric Symptomology, Affective & Behavioral Dysregulation
Broadly, results from the current sample of children and adolescents converge with outcomes
obtained from comparable samples of children and adolescents presenting for clinical services,
including combinations of demographic and symptom profiles / presentations (Hopkins, Gouze,
Lavigne & Bryant, 2019). First, outcomes from youth’s self-report measures of psychiatric
symptoms, including depression, ADHD and related outcomes, will be discussed across samplewide and group-level results. Next, results from hypothesized relationships between unconscious
emotion regulation processes and psychiatric symptoms will be reviewed and discussed in light of
their theoretical and empirical links.
Depression [CDI-2, SR (S)]. Youth’s depression symptoms were measured based on
outcomes from the 12-item, self-report CDI-2, SR(S), questionnaire. Raw scores were converted
to standardized T-scores based on normed groups, corresponding to one of two age groups,
including: younger (preadolescents, ages 7-12) or older (adolescents, ages 13 – 17), and further
subdivided by biological sex (e.g., females / males). Consistent with the clinical nature of the
sample, Total Depression (DEP) T-scores across the entire sample fell within the Elevated range
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(65 – 69T). Consistent with predictions, results also revealed age as a significant predictor for
increased depression, and overall, higher self-reported depression among adolescents compared to
preadolescents, regardless of biological sex. Further, follow-up analyses regarding self-report
depression symptoms revealed only one significant between-group difference (i.e., lowest versus
highest groups). Specifically, outcomes indicated that average depression scores for older females
(ages 13-17) in the Very Elevated (70 – 90T or above) range were significantly higher compared
to younger (ages 8-12) females, whose DEP T-scores fell within the High Average (60 – 65T)
range.
Overall, these findings suggest inherent differences in depression symptoms across children
and adolescents in the current sample, and further, as youth compare to their non-clinical peers.
Importantly however, these results were obtained from a sample of service-seeking youth and
families, suggesting underlying strengths which attune them to their own distress or mobilize
intrinsic resources to covey and attend to their own distress (e.g., verbal expression). Alternatively,
and more often the case among clinical samples of children and adolescents, it may be that youth’s
inability to effectively cope with their own responses to internal or external stimuli results in overt
behavioral or emotional issues and inhibited functioning overall. As a result, youth are brought in
for psychological assessment and treatment at the request, insistence or demand of a caregiver,
educator or other important adults. Based on the hypotheses and predicted relationships guiding
the current study, the section below discusses interactions and underlying connections between
youth’s self-report depression (DEP T-scores) and measures of unconscious emotion regulation
processes, including: Affect Maturity (AM), Object Relations (OR) and use of Defense
Mechanisms (DMs).
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DEP T-scores, AMS-M, DMs & MOA-M. Regarding depression symptoms, results across the
entire sample offer mixed support for a priori hypotheses organizing the current study. First,
outcomes across the entire sample did not support predicted relationships between Affect Maturity
(AMS) and depression symptoms, such that higher average AMS (AMS-M) scores did not predict
or associate with lower Total Depression (DEP) T-scores. Further, no differences emerged
according to age or biological sex based on AMS-M and DEP T-scores. Empirical research
exploring emotion regulating processes may shed light on unexpected outcomes obtained from the
current sample.
Relatedly, outcomes from the current sample partially supported hypothesized relationships
between use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs) and depression symptoms. Specifically, higher rates
of immature defense use (e.g., Denial) were expected to correspond with higher DEP T-scores,
particularly as youth aged, indicating underdeveloped or insufficient unconscious emotion
regulation. As predicted, outcomes revealed significant correlations between use of Denial (DEN)
and self-reported depression symptoms across all youth, although follow-up analyses revealed that
this statically significant relationship was largely driven by results among younger females (ages
8 – 12). Further, results among younger females (ages 8 – 12) in the sample support predicted
outcomes, such that use of Denial (DEN) was associated with increased depression symptoms.
However, expected relationships between mature defense use (e.g., Identification) and lower DEP
T-scores were not supported in the current study. Rather, adolescent females (ages 13 – 17) were
found to have both the highest rates of depression symptoms and use of Identification (IDEN) was
significantly higher among females in the sample overall. Combined, these results suggest that
prominent use of immature defenses (e.g., Denial) may serve adaptive functions and protect
against psychological distress and symptoms of depression during early periods of development
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(e.g., preadolescence). However, clinically-elevated rates of depression were still indicated across
all groups of youth in the current sample, suggesting that the prominence and reliance on immature
defense mechanisms (e.g., Denial) may serve adaptive functions during earlier periods of
development, protecting overwhelming or unbearable stimuli or feelings from conscious
awareness.
Further, outcomes from the current sample provided mixed support for predicted relationships
between mature defenses (e.g., Projection and Identification) and rates of depression symptoms,
particularly as youth age. Namely, outcomes across the entire sample indicated no significant
associations between use of Projection (PRO) and Total Depression (DEP) T-scores across the
entire sample or within specific subgroups. Next, rates of Identification (IDEN) were shown to
associate with DEP T-scores, however directly inverse from predictions. Specifically, outcomes
revealed increased use of IDEN was associated with higher self-report DEP T-scores, particularly
among adolescent females in the sample. Combined, outcomes from the current study suggest a
unique combination of vulnerability and protective factors associated with the development and
maturation of defense mechanisms and onset of psychiatric symptoms associated with depression.
Overall, distinct outcomes between females and males support theories of developmental shifts in
emotion regulation processes, even those which occur outside the realm of conscious awareness.
Namely, results across the current sample of females suggests that earlier development of mature
defense mechanisms (e.g., Identification) may not be sufficient to protect against the onset of
depression symptoms, as indicated by comparable DEP T-scores between younger males and
females. Further, proportionate use of Identification (IDEN) was significantly higher among
females versus males, although no significant differences emerged regarding IDEN use between
preadolescent and adolescent females.
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Due to the cross-sectional nature of the current sample, between-group differences according
to age-group and biological sex must be interpreted with caution, and further, may reflect
unexpected and/or untested relationships between measured constructs. However, comparable
rates of DEP T-scores among younger males and females suggests that the early onset of
Identification (IDEN) alone, even when coupled with increased Affect Maturity (AM), is
insufficient to buffer against depression symptoms. Further, it may be that transforming the
qualitative experience of emotions, reducing their intensity from atmospheric to ‘event-like’
phenomena, is still insufficient to allow for negative affect (e.g., sadness) to be acknowledged, and
as a result, must be defended against—predominantly, by way of Denial (DEN). Further, outcomes
from adolescent females in particular, may suggest that an increased capacity to experience,
tolerate and express sadness or depressed feelings (unlike their male and younger peers), occurs
through maturing systems of unconscious emotion regulation. As noted above, outcomes from the
current study are cross-sectional, such that it remains unclear whether or not DMs scores captured
an emerging, stunted or regressed stage of emotional and intrapsychic development across youth
in the study.
However, results obtained regarding youth’s Object Relations (OR) scores may shed further
light on unconscious factors implicated in emotion regulation and the onset of psychiatric
symptoms. Specifically, and consistent with predictions, outcomes across the entire sample
revealed that worse OR scores (MOA-M) associated with higher Depression (DEP) T-scores, even
when controlling for age and biological sex. Follow-up analyses further indicated that when
combined with age, worse MOA-M scores accounted for nearly one third of the total variance in
youth’s DEP T-scores, and as further evidenced by adolescent females’ Very Elevated rates of
depression. Again, due to the cross-sectional nature of the current study, directional relationships
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between MOA-M and measures of other unconscious constructs remain unclear. However, as
noted above, results indicated that worse OR (MOA-M) scores, which showed no significant
changes or differences across age groups, were associated with greater use of Denial (DEN)
overall. Combined, outcomes may suggest that unhealthy Object Relations, established during the
formative stages of development, may uniquely contribute to emotional dysregulation and the
onset of depression symptoms in childhood, and even further throughout the course of
development.
ADHD & Related Outcomes (Conners—3, SR). ADHD and Related Outcomes were also
assessed based on youth’s self-report, using the 99-item Conners—3rd Edition, Self-Report Form
(Conners—3, SR). Results from the entire sample indicate youth experience symptoms within the
Average range across most domains, including: Learning Problems (LP) and Family Problems
(FAM). Further, no significant relationships between LP or FAM T-scores emerged according to
youth’s age, biological sex and/or measures of unconscious emotion regulation processes (e.g.,
AM, DMs or OR). As a result, no further analyses were conducted based on these three subscales.
Relatedly, outcomes across the entire sample indicated Inattentiveness (INT) T-scores in the High
Average. However, inconsistent with predictions regarding internalization, but similar to outcomes
from LP and FAM subscales, results revealed no significant relationships between youth’s
biological sex, age and/or measures of AM, DMs and OR.
Outcomes from the current study however, offered support for predicted relationships between
externalized symptoms and unconscious processes related to emotion regulation. Namely,
Defiance / Aggression (DEF) scores fell within the Average range, with no indicated differences
according to youth’s age and/or biological sex. However, results from analyses based on predicted
relationships revealed that lower Affect Maturity (AMS) and use of immature defenses (e.g.,
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Denial) were associated with higher DEF T-scores across the entire sample. Further, HYP Tscores, which were in the High Average range across the entire sample, showed unique patterns
according to youth’s age and biological sex. Specifically, regardless of age, males across the
sample reported significantly higher rates of hyperactivity / impulsivity symptoms compared to
females. Further, results indicated comparable rates of HYP T-scores between younger (ages 812) and older (ages 13-17) males, whereas adolescent females reported significantly less
hyperactivity / impulsivity symptoms compared to preadolescents.
According to hypothesized and tested relationships between symptoms of externalization (e.g.
hyperactivity and aggression), the following sections include further discussion of HYP and DEF
T-score results obtained from the current sample of children and adolescents. Specifically, results
obtained from self-report measures of hyperactivity / impulsivity and defiance / aggression as
related to significant relationships with unconscious emotion regulation processes will be further
discussed below.
HYP T-scores, AMS-M, DMs & MOA-M. Regarding relationships between HYP T-scores and
measures of unconscious processes, results from the current study revealed mixed support for
predicted and tested relationships. First, and inconsistent with predictions, outcomes from the
current study revealed no significant relationships between hyperactivity / impulsivity self-report
scores and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs), including: Denial (DEN) and Projection (PRO).
However, a significant inverse association initially emerged between Identification (IDEN) and
HYP T-scores, which was no longer significant after controlling for age, nor was it due to
significant differences between females and males. Combined, outcomes further suggest that early
maturation of implicit emotion regulation (e.g., use of Identification) may support a developmental
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shift away from externalization towards internalization by way of intrapsychic connections to
important others.
Relatedly, outcomes confirmed predictions that worse Object Relations (MOA-M) and lower
Affect Maturity (AMS-M) scores were each significant predictors of higher Hyperactivity /
Impulsivity (HYP) T-scores. However, only MOA-M results remained significant after controlling
for age. Further, when combined with age as a predictor variable, MOA-M scores accounted for
more variance in predicting total HYP T-scores, and as noted, only lower (worse) MOA-M scores
still predicted higher HYP T-scores after controlling for age. Overall, results from the current
sample of children and adolescents reflect predicted associations between Object Relations (OR)
and behavioral dysregulation (i.e., hyperactivity / impulsivity). More interesting still, results
further suggest that above and beyond developmentally-driven processes (e.g., Affect Maturity),
worse OR is a stronger predictor of HYP T-scores. These results held true even when controlling
for demographic variables, including age and biological sex. Combined, these results suggest that
restlessness, hyperactivity and impulse control (or lack thereof) may be related, or due in part, to
insufficient or underdeveloped emotion regulation processes, including the incapacity for
sustained emotional experiences and an overreliance on physical, as opposed to verbal expressions
of affective experience.
Due again to the cross-sectional nature of outcomes from the current study, directional and/or
causal relationships linking unconscious emotion regulation and hyperactivity / impulsivity scores
over the course of development should be approached cautiously. However, results appear to lend
support for case studies and psychoanalytic theories about childhood ADHD, positing that
externalized and dysregulated behaviors—often categorized as hyperactivity and impulsivity—
may reflect unconscious, intrapsychic conflicts, ambivalent self-concepts and poor distress
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tolerance (Cramer, 2015; Rainwater, 2007; Sugarman, 2006). Results may further suggest that lack
of self-other differentiation, sustained autonomy and an internalized sense of ‘goodness’ may
interfere with one’s capacity to self-soothe and modulate emotional experiences (O’Neil &
Rudenstine, 2018). Alternatively, outcomes may best be understood within the context of Affect
Maturity (AM) scores, which were significantly higher across age groups of females as compared
to males. Specifically, significantly lower rates of HYP T-scores among adolescent females
compared to others in the sample, may suggest that early affect maturation promotes sustained and
increased capacity for self-monitoring and regulation into later periods of development. Finally,
outcomes from the current study may indicate that in and of itself, increased Affect Maturity can
serve as a protective factor against externalized dysregulation, including hyperactivity and
impulsivity. However, the vulnerability brought on by poor Object Relatedness may override or
supersede one’s own developing self-regulation and maturational processes.
DEF, AMS-M, MOA-M, DMs. Finally, outcomes from the current study included both
predicted and unexpected significant relationships between Defiance / Aggression (DEF) T-scores
and unconscious emotion regulation processes. First, and inconsistent with predictions, Object
Relations (OR) and DEF T-scores were not associated, although these results will be further
discussed throughout the section below. However, DEF T-scores were associated with use of
Defense Mechanisms (DMs). Specifically, results across the entire sample supported predictions,
such that use of Denial (DEN) was associated with higher DEF T-scores, such that youth’s
overreliance on immature strategies for modulating emotional experiences (e.g., ‘ignoring’ the
event) was associated with increased self-report of defiant and/or aggressive behaviors (e.g.,
breaking other’s property or disobeying rules). In contrast, however, outcomes were nonsignificant for Projection (PRO) and Identification (IDEN). Combined with results outlined above,

101

outcomes suggest that youth in the current sample over-rely on primitive strategies to avoid
unpleasant or intolerable emotional stimuli. However, as one ages out of the developmental period
from where immature defenses emerge (e.g., infancy and early childhood), they become
increasingly maladaptive and unsustainable. Further, results suggest that when one’s efforts to
avoid or ignore reality are interrupted or ineffectual, a lack of internal self-regulation may lead to
externalized aggression and/or direct opposition to redouble initial efforts. Somewhat
unexpectedly, neither Projection (PRO) nor Identification (IDEN) were associated with DEF Tscores, which may be due to limited DEF T-scores reported across the entire sample and/or low
statistical power due to the current sample size. Alternatively, it may be that overreliance on
primitive defenses (e.g., Denial), as opposed to the onset or development of mature defenses (e.g.,
Identification), may create unique vulnerability to antisocial and/or maladaptive behaviors and
emotional expressions.
Next, results across the sample supported predicted associations between Affect Maturity
(AM) and Defiance / Aggression (DEF), such that greater AMS scores were associated with lower
DEF T-scores. Overall, outcomes reflect meaningful shifts in one’s experience of and reaction to
emotional experiences, as outlined in Thompson’s Affect Maturity Scale (AMS, 1981).
Specifically, Thompson (1981) describes the transition from externalized to internalized emotion
regulation to incorporate new temporal awareness of the self and other, including one’s own
actions and their consequences, including associated feelings of remorse, regret and guilt.
In addition to the outcomes described above, follow-up analyses further revealed that
statistically, the relationship between Denial (DEN) and DEF T-score is actually explained by way
of mediation through Affect Maturity (AM). Specifically, results suggest that less use of Denial
(DEN) may allow for new or increased exposure to situations or interactions that bring on
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unpleasant or overwhelming emotions, or alternatively, allows for new opportunities to experience
and expand temporal contact with one’s emotional inner life. While results from the current study
revealed no statistically significant relationship between Object Relations (OR) and DEF T-scores,
containing intense emotions is most likely impossible, traumatic and/or threatening if one’s
internal object world lacks independence or a positive self-ideation. In turn, loss of sustained
motivation and positive self-concept contribute to the onset of internalized psychiatric symptoms
(e.g., depression) or externalized behaviors (e.g., oppositional defiance), in addition to loss of
social or interpersonal orientation (e.g., anti-social or delinquent behaviors).
Emotion (Dys)Regulation as a Transdiagnostic Construct
In addition to results obtained from self-report measures and projective tests outlined above,
results from the current study shed light on underlying relationships between psychiatric symptoms
and emotion dysregulation—that is, the tendency for emotions to become out of control, change
rapidly, or become expressed in intense, unmodified forms and exceed one’s coping and reasoning
capacities (Bradley et al., 2011). Combined, outcomes across youth self-reports converge with a
“transdiagnostic” approach to psychiatric evaluation and treatment, which conceptualizes
emotional dysregulation as a universal, underlying source of psychological distress (Sloan, Hall,
Moulding, Bryce, Mildred & Steiger, 2010). Further, results converge with Sugarman’s (2006)
assertion that psychiatric symptoms reflect a failed effort to maintain equilibrium and selfregulation while balancing competing mental processes, resulting in the breakdown of emotional
control (e.g., unmodulated affective expressions).
Unconscious psychological processes are, by definition, outside the realm of conscious
awareness, and as a result, pose significant challenges to theorists and researchers interested in
exploring underlying relationships between intrapsychic systems involved in emotional and self103

regulation. However, as indicated by outcomes from children and adolescents in the current
sample, Defense Mechanisms, Affect Maturity and Object Relations may significantly influence
one’s experience of affect and affectively-laden events, including their intensity and amplitude,
perhaps even more so than the ‘objective’ realities of an event itself. Results from children and
adolescents in the current sample further suggest that developmentally-driven processes beginning
with the earliest stages of life, may have overarching implications for the ways in which systems
of emotional regulation are activated and employed. Overall, outcomes reveal that
developmentally appropriate (mature), intrapsychic processes support effective management of
physiological and affective reactions to internal state changes or external events, whereas outdated,
ineffective or overly-relied upon systems lead to dysfunction and dysregulation.
More specifically, results from the current sample suggest that it may be the quality of
internalized emotion regulation systems that influence the ways in which dysregulation is not only
experienced but also expressed. Specifically, outcomes suggest that particular kinds of emotions
(e.g., sadness, anxiety or anger) under certain circumstances, may be uniquely (dys)regulated at
the intersection of conscious and unconscious factors. Further, results suggest that underlying
deficits in implicit emotion regulation systems may operate uniquely according to biopsychosocial
factors and demographics (e.g., biological sex or chronological age). However due to the crosssectional nature of this study, no conclusions could be derived regarding changes across
unconscious emotion regulation processes and psychiatric symptoms over time.
However, outcomes across the current sample revealed that intrapsychic maturity—including
higher Affect Maturity and use of mature defenses (i.e., Identification)—may support the
transformation of emotions from ‘atmospheric’, towards less threatening ‘event-like’ experiences,
which also coincide with sustained awareness of temporality and ‘real’ or ‘imagined’ others.
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Relatedly, regarding Object Relations, the ability to hold in mind an independent, benign ‘object’
offers an internal sanctuary to retreat from environmental threats to one’s emotional equilibrium
or self-concept, itself a result of on-going interactions with one’s sociocultural milieu. However,
without the refuge of a ‘good’ internal object, one’s self–concept is tenuously held at best,
internalized as inter- or co-dependent, unindividuated and/or malevolent. Consequently, exposure
to threats cannot be acknowledged, let alone tolerated, without risking the loss of an internal and
enduring sense of one’s own ‘goodness.’ Further, when interactions with overwhelming realities
cannot be confronted and worked through, they remain ‘split off’—literally and intrapsychically—
and relegated to an old and well-protected place, spared from conscious harm or distress.
Consequently, and as indicated by outcomes among youth in the current sample, unhealthy Object
Relations (OR) may contribute to the overuse of and overreliance on immature defense
mechanisms (e.g., Denial (DEN) past their stage of developmental prominence.
Specifically, results indicated a unique relationship between use of Denial (DEN),
Identification (IDEN) and Affect Maturity (AM), such that high rates of DEN without IDEN (as
indicated among males), may lead to increased Defiance and Aggression (DEF), as noted in results
across the entire sample. Whereas high use of DEN accompanied by increased IDEN—as noted
among adolescent females, specifically—may lead to depression and / or hyperactivity and
impulsivity symptoms. Overall, the differences in affective symptom and/or behavioral
presentations noted between these two groups may be best understood as part of incremental
regulation and integration processes which evolve as part of on-going development and through
interpersonal experiences.
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Theoretical, Clinical & Empirical Implications
In addition to results outlined above, outcomes from the current study have several
implications for and contribute to on-going research regarding psychological development and
psychopathology, as it emerges and develops over the life course. Moreover, outcomes also lend
support for the continued use of psychodynamic and psychoanalytically informed clinical
instruments for scientific research and assessment practices, including opportunities for
strengthening and expanding use of well-established projective instruments (e.g., Rorschach
Inkblot Method, Thematic Apperception Test). In addition, outcomes lend further support for the
use of projective tests to operationalize and measure unconscious constructs by way of
psychometrically sound scoring systems (e.g., Defense Mechanism Manual) and innovative
applications of results. Finally, results from the current study may inform future research
investigations used to measure and integrate results from projective tests and self-report measures
as part of clinical practice with children and adolescents.
Further, outcomes from the current study indicate that myriad factors—including those outside
the realm of conscious awareness—influence one’s ability to take in and modulate reactions to
both internal and external stressors or environmental stimuli. Results also indicate that specific
domains or systems of emotional regulation may influence the manifestation and persistence of
specific affective and behavioral presentations. Namely, and somewhat unexpectedly, results from
the ADHD and Related Outcomes self-report questionnaire (Conners—3, SR) indicate that healthy
Object Relationships (OR)—or one’s internalized sense of self and others—may uniquely protect
against externalizing presentations (e.g., Hyperactivity/ Impulsivity) or internalizing psychiatric
symptoms (e.g., depression). Further, outcomes suggest that underdeveloped or immature systems
for regulation (e.g., Defense Mechanisms and Affect Maturity) may uniquely contribute to defiant
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and aggressive behaviors. Finally, when comparing age group differences, results from the current
study suggest that as youth age, poor Object Relations uniquely contribute to developing
depression and hyperactivity / impulsivity and warrant further investigation in the future.
Finally, results from the current study add to the growing body of empirical research exploring
effective psychological treatment and interventions for children and adolescents presenting with
affective and behavioral dysregulation. For example, clinical assessments and manualized
behavioral interventions for youth most often attempt to modify actions, behaviors and cognitions
which focus on sequelae of emotional dysregulation (e.g., psychiatric symptoms). Namely,
interventions to treat depression often emphasize behavioral activation, cognitive reframing or
psychiatric medication to address internalizing symptoms. For inattentive ADHD youth,
interventions may focus on improving attention control and sustained focused. Whereas treatment
for hyperactivity emphasizes behavioral (impulse) control and physiological self-regulation
(Salmonsson, 20110). In contrast, psychodynamic psychotherapies encourage curiosity about
feelings, their underlying relationships and interconnections and understanding one’s self and
inner world through the therapeutic relationship and others in turn (Tuber, 2012). Consistent with
results from the current study, interventions with emotionally dysregulated youth may best be used
to address the ways in which they understand, experience and engage with emotions that underlie
their outward, behavioral presentation. In other words, clinical interventions with children and
adolescents should be geared towards the unconscious, intrapsychic processes which contribute to
youth’s internal experiences or systems of emotional regulation and dysregulation.
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Study Limitations
Several limitations are present in the current study and inform the ways in which outcomes are
interpretable and/or translatable across diverse samples and populations. First, results from the
current study are based on a sample of children and adolescents seeking psychological services at
a community-based mental health clinic in Harlem, New York. As a result, sample demographics
reflect a racially/ethnically diverse patient population of males and females between ages 8-17.
Therefore, outcomes from the current clinical population may not translate to or reflect outcomes
across other highly-specified samples and non-clinically based groups. Second, outcomes from the
current study are based on a relatively small sample (N = 51) of youth. Due to the small sample
size, demographic factors were not included as part of the hypotheses or analyses of the current
study, however warrant future investigation. Third, due to the parameters of self-report measures
used in the current study, youth below age eight were not included in analyses, and as a result,
may also warrant further investigation as related outcomes from the current study. Finally, all
outcomes from the current study are based on youth’s self-report symptoms of depression, ADHD
and Related Outcomes measured when they first present for clinical evaluation and treatment
services at a community-based mental health clinic. Accordingly, data reflect a cross-sectional
(i.e., between-subject group comparisons) snapshot of youth’s depression and ADHD symptoms
as opposed to longitudinal (i.e., within-subject comparison) changes over time. Consequently,
outcomes from the current study do not shed light on direct causal relationships between internal
emotion regulation systems (e.g., use of Identification) as they change and mature throughout the
course of psychotherapy. Consequently, outcomes from predictive analyses (e.g., linear regression
analyses) should be interpreted with caution.
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Recommendations & Future Directions
Results from the current study shed light on future directions for empirical research exploring
unconscious processes and psychiatric symptoms among children and adolescents. To date, the
current study is the first to examine concurrent relationships between Affect Maturity (AMS),
Object Relations (OR) and use of Defense Mechanisms (DMs) as related to self-report psychiatric
symptoms of depression [CDI-2, SR(S)] and ADHD & related outcomes (Conners 3—SR). As a
result, analyses should be reexplored with the continued accumulation of clinical data from
children and adolescents, including both cross-sectional and longitudinal collections. Future
studies may also include a non-clinical comparison group of children and adolescents to identify
differences and/or similarities regarding unconscious emotion regulation systems, as compared to
the current study population. Further, future studies should consider inclusion of self-report and/or
observational methods to evaluation psychiatric symptoms among children younger than eight to
identify clinically meaningful distinctions related to growth and development. Further, and as
reflected in the hypotheses, the current study considered youth’s age and biological sex (assigned
at birth) as they contributed to measures of unconscious processes, self-reported psychiatric
symptoms and their interactions. However, myriad other distinct factors shown to influence
intrapsychic development and functioning (e.g., race/ethnicity, sexuality or sexual identity,
household education/income, etc.), were not similarly tested due to the small sample size, although
should be considered in future studies.
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Conclusions
To date, no previous studies have examined statistical relationships between the current
combination of unconscious processes alongside self-report measures of psychiatric symptoms
among youth. Overall, results from the current study converge with earlier findings, suggesting
underlying relationships between unconscious emotion regulation systems and both internalized
and externalized dysregulation (Cramer & Kelly, 2004; Muris, Winands, & Horselenberg, 2003).
More specifically, outcomes suggest underlying associations between youth’s self-reported
psychiatric symptoms of depression and ADHD symptoms (e.g., hyperactivity and defiance) and
unconscious, intrapsychic systems of self and interpersonal regulation.
Overall, results from the current study intend to build on previous empirical research exploring
unconscious, intrapsychic processes known to support emotional self-regulation and the ways in
which they influence children and adolescent’s conscious experience of, and self-report on
psychiatric symptoms. Further, results from the current study support the integration of
psychodynamic instruments (projective tests) and assessment of unconscious phenomenon (e.g.,
OR) as part of standard clinical practice for assessments and evaluations. More specifically, results
converge with previous research findings which suggest that some internal systems of emotion
regulation occur unconsciously and mature naturally as part of the on-going developmental and
aging process including Affect Maturity (AMS) and use of mature Defense Mechanisms (DMs)
(e.g., Identification) whereas others such as Object Relations (OR) do not (i.e., Gray, 2018;
Cramer, 2001; Cramer, 2015). Further, results from the current study indicate that AM, DMs and
OR may each play a unique role in protecting against or predisposing youth to internalizing,
externalizing or combined presentations, including: defiant and aggressive behaviors,
hyperactivity / impulsivity and depression.
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